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1 
INCORPORATING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
INTO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Paul T. Crane* 
A curious relationship currently exists between collateral 
consequences and criminal procedures.  It is now widely 
accepted that collateral consequences are an integral 
component of the American criminal justice system.  Such 
consequences shape the contours of many criminal cases, 
influencing what charges are brought by the government, the 
content of plea negotiations, the sentences imposed by trial 
judges, and the impact of criminal convictions on defendants.  
Yet, when it comes to the allocation of criminal procedures, 
collateral consequences continue to be treated as if they are 
external to the criminal justice process.  Specifically, a 
conviction’s collateral consequences, no matter how severe, 
are typically treated as irrelevant when determining whether 
a defendant is entitled to a particular procedural protection. 
This Article examines that paradoxical relationship and, 
after identifying a previously overlooked reason for its 
existence, provides a framework for incorporating collateral 
consequences into criminal procedure.  Heavily influenced by 
concerns of practicality and feasibility, the proposed 
methodology establishes a theoretically coherent path 
forward that requires only modest adjustments to existing 
doctrines.  After setting forth the three-step framework, the 
Article applies its insights to the two most hallowed rights in 
our criminal justice system: the constitutional right to counsel 
and the constitutional right to a jury trial. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Collateral consequences of conviction have recently received 
extensive attention from the legal profession1 and legal academy.2  
And rightly so.  Collateral consequences—which include sanctions 
like removal from the United States,3 sex offender registration,4 
firearm prohibitions,5 and disqualifications from public benefits6—
are frequently the most important result of a criminal conviction.  
Collateral consequences impact, often deeply, the lives of millions of 
criminal defendants each year.7  Such collateral consequences also 
shape the contours of many criminal cases, influencing what charges 
are brought by the government, the content of plea negotiations 
between prosecutors and defense counsel, and sentences imposed by 
 
 1. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010); UNIF. 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL 
SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 
§ 19-1.1–1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed. 2004). 
 2. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance 
of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 718–
19 (2002); Gabriel J. Chin, What Are Defense Lawyers For?  Links Between 
Collateral Consequences and the Criminal Process, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 151, 155 
(2012); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences 
of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated 
Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 624–25 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, An 
Integrated Perspective]; Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry 
and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 (2010) 
[hereinafter Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives]; Jenny Roberts, The Mythical 
Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: 
Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 
672 (2008). 
 3. Chin, supra note 2. 
 4. Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives, supra note 2. 
 5. Chin, supra note 2, at 159–60. 
 6. Id. at 155. 
 7. Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, 
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 126–
128 (2009). 
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trial judges.8  In short, collateral consequences are an integral 
component of the American criminal justice system. 
But collateral consequences remain on the outside of the criminal 
justice process in one critical respect: a conviction’s collateral 
consequences, no matter how severe, are typically treated as 
irrelevant when determining whether a defendant is entitled to a 
particular procedural protection.  Several important procedural 
entitlements are allocated only to some criminal defendants.  For 
example, only some criminal defendants receive the right to counsel, 
the right to a jury trial, the right to a preliminary hearing, the right 
to a grand jury, or the right to heightened levels of discovery.9  And 
the determination of whether a defendant receives any one of these 
protections is based solely on a single sanction—imprisonment.10  In 
other words, when it comes to deciding how to distribute procedural 
entitlements to criminal defendants, potential collateral 
consequences of conviction are rarely, if ever, considered.  In this 
respect, collateral consequences continue to be treated as if they are 
external to the criminal justice process—an approach that not only 
blinks reality but also has the pernicious effect of depriving 
defendants facing severe sanctions from procedures designed to 
increase accuracy and fairness. 
The persistence of this paradox—that collateral consequences are 
integral to the criminal justice system but are peripheral to the 
allocation of procedural entitlements—presents something of a 
puzzle.  If collateral consequences have been widely recognized as 
critically important to those processed through the criminal justice 
system and to those processing the system, why do such consequences 
continue to remain unaccounted for when distributing procedural 
entitlements to criminal defendants?  This question, and the 
relationship between collateral consequences and procedural 
entitlements more generally, has received sparingly little attention 
from the academy.  While the impact collateral consequences have on 
criminal defendants post-conviction has received thorough scrutiny 
from scholars,11 the potential impact of collateral consequences on the 
front-end of the criminal justice process—namely, how collateral 
 
 8. See infra Subpart III.B. 
 9. Many criminal defendants do not receive most or even any of these 
procedural protections.  For more, see infra Part II. 
 10. Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 808 
(2016). 
 11. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for 
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 
154–55 (1999); Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2; Jeremy Travis, 
Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 15–16 
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375149 
W03_CRANE.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/19  1:23 PM 
2019] INCORPORATING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 5 
consequences intersect with procedural entitlements—has been 
largely overlooked.12 
This Article’s first contribution is identifying a thus far 
underappreciated reason for why courts and legislatures have failed 
to incorporate collateral consequences into the allocation of criminal 
procedures: incorporating collateral consequences requires courts and 
legislatures to engage in difficult line-drawing decisions given the 
various incommensurability issues raised by collateral consequences, 
thereby discouraging them from undertaking the project in the first 
place. 
More specifically, several significant conceptual and practical 
questions arise once one looks beyond imprisonment when deciding 
how to allocate procedural protections across defendants.  For 
example, should all potential collateral consequences be considered, 
or only some?  What about collateral consequences that are imposed 
by another sovereign—like federal collateral consequences that flow 
from a state conviction?  What about collateral consequences that are 
ultimately imposed at the discretion of an administrative body—like 
ineligibility for certain public welfare benefits or other forms of 
financial assistance?  What about collateral consequences that do not 
uniformly apply to all defendants—like immigration consequences 
that apply only to noncitizens?  And what makes a potential collateral 
consequence, or constellation of consequences, sufficiently severe so 
as to warrant heightened procedural protections? 
The few courts to have considered some of these important 
questions have struggled to produce coherent, let alone consistent, 
answers.  Courts have not only reached conflicting results,13 but those 
 
 12. To the extent there has been a discussion about collateral consequences 
and procedural rights, the focus has been on what advice defense counsel must 
provide their clients.  See, e.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note 2; Roberts, supra note 
7, at 148–49; Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and 
Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 678 (2011); Chin, supra 
note 2, at 156–58; Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 
693, 719–20 (2011).  This scholarly focus on advice by defense counsel is 
unsurprising given the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010), 
which now requires counsel to advise defendants on potential immigration 
consequences prior to pleading guilty.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 
359–60 (2010). 
 13. For example, a recent division of authority involves whether a defendant 
subject to removal from the United States upon conviction is constitutionally 
entitled to a jury trial.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, for instance, 
recently became the first court to hold that a defendant facing deportation does 
have the right to demand a jury trial.  See Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 
1246–47 (D.C. 2018).  The New York Court of Appeals soon followed suit, also 
holding that a defendant facing deportation is entitled a jury trial under the Sixth 
Amendment.  See People v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168, 172 (N.Y. 2018).  In reaching 
these conclusions, the D.C. and New York high courts diverged from courts like 
the Nevada Supreme Court, which held that defendants facing deportation upon 
conviction do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial.  See Amezcua v. 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 319 P.3d 602, 605 (Nev. 2014). 
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courts that arrive at the same conclusion often give competing 
rationales for their respective decisions.14  And no court has sought to 
establish a comprehensive approach to incorporating collateral 
consequences, instead focusing on the specific consequence and 
particular procedure before them in a given case. 
The academy also has largely eschewed the enterprise of 
incorporating collateral consequences into criminal procedure, and 
the few scholars and commentators to have examined the intersection 
of collateral consequences and criminal procedures have done so in 
fairly limited ways.  Some scholars, for example, have focused on a 
single collateral consequence (immigration) and single procedural 
entitlement (right to counsel).15  Others have argued for the universal 
 
In the context of whether a defendant facing the threat of sex offender 
registration is entitled to a jury trial, all but one court to consider the issue has 
said “no.”  See, e.g., Ivy v. United States, No. 5:08-CR-00021-TBR, 2010 WL 
1257729, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2010); Rauch v. United States, No. 1:07-CV-
0730 WMW, 2007 WL 2900181, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007); Thomas v. 
United States, 942 A.2d 1180, 1186 (D.C. 2008); People v. Danthuluri, 923 
N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. App. Term 2011).  But see Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 
540, 543–44 (Ariz. 2008) (holding that a defendant facing sex offender 
registration is entitled to a jury trial under state constitution because that 
collateral consequence (1) “ar[o]se directly from statutory Arizona law”; (2) is 
“severe”; and (3) applies “uniformly to all persons convicted of a particular 
offense”). 
In the context of firearm prohibitions, courts have similarly rejected arguments 
for heightened procedures with regularity.  See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 204 
F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We hold that the prohibition of firearm 
possession by persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is 
not so serious as to entitle them to a jury trial for a presumptively petty offense.”); 
United States v. Jardee, No. 4:09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242, at *4 (D.N.D. Feb. 
12, 2010); United States v. Combs, No. 8:05CR271, 2005 WL 3262983, at *3 (D. 
Neb. Dec. 1, 2005); Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 605.  But see United States v. Smith, 
151 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1318 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (finding that a lifetime ban on 
firearm possession warrants affording the defendant a right to a jury trial). 
 14. Compare Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 605 (rejecting claim that the threat of 
deportation entitled a defendant to a jury trial because it arises out of federal 
law, not Nevada law), with Fretes-Zarate v. United States, 40 A.3d 374, 378–79 
(D.C. 2012) (rejecting claim that the threat of deportation entitled defendant to a 
jury trial because that collateral penalty was not one “the trial judge had the 
authority to impose” and was a “hypothetical penalt[y] that could arise only in 
separate civil and administrative proceedings”). 
 15. A thoughtful piece on this score is Alice Clapman’s Petty Offenses, Drastic 
Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen 
Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585 (2011).  In that article, 
Clapman argues that “Padilla has implications beyond the scope of a defense 
attorney’s obligations to his client, and specifically that it supports a re-
examination of the now-classical rule that defendants who do not face 
incarceration have no right to counsel, at least to the extent of expanding that 
rule to include deportation.”  Id. at 617–18.  Notably, Clapman’s article only 
examines whether the right to counsel should be expanded for defendants facing 
potential immigration consequences.  She does not explore other procedural 
entitlements or other collateral consequences. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375149 
W03_CRANE.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/19  1:23 PM 
2019] INCORPORATING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 7 
expansion of the right to counsel given the increased prevalence of 
collateral consequences generally.16  But none have charted a 
comprehensive course for incorporating collateral consequences into 
criminal procedure. 
In a previous work, I argued that collateral consequences should 
be accounted for when allocating criminal procedural entitlements 
and gave several reasons why that should happen, but left for another 
day the difficult question of how to incorporate collateral 
consequences into criminal procedure.17  This Article now tackles that 
important question and, in so doing, explains how courts and 
legislatures can incorporate collateral consequences into the 
allocation of criminal procedural entitlements. 
This Article’s core contribution is providing a framework for 
incorporating collateral consequences into criminal procedures—a 
framework that is theoretically coherent, practically feasible, and 
requires only modest adjustments to existing doctrines.  My 
methodology also alleviates concerns about incommensurability and 
establishes a path forward that aligns the allocation of procedural 
entitlements with the fact that collateral consequences are often the 
most significant sanction of a criminal case.  Put simply, the current 
distribution of procedural entitlements is based on an outdated 
model, where imprisonment is treated as the only significant sanction 
imposed upon conviction.  That antiquated approach—and the 
harmful effects it creates—should be cast aside, and this Article 
provides a roadmap for doing so. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II details the curious 
relationship that currently exists between collateral consequences 
and criminal procedures and explains why collateral consequences 
continue to remain unaccounted for in the distribution of procedural 
entitlements. 
 
Other scholars have similarly focused solely on immigration when 
considering the potential expansion of procedural protections.  See, e.g., Orrie A. 
Levy, Due Process and the Post-Padilla Landscape: Balancing the Severity of 
Deportation as a Collateral Consequence with a Court’s Traditionally Narrow 
Obligation in Accepting a Plea, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 41 (2012) 
(examining whether, after Padilla v. Kentucky, trial courts should inform a 
defendant of potential immigration consequences before accepting a guilty plea). 
 16. See, e.g., John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to 
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 1, 34 (2013); Paul Marcus, Why the United 
States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a Lot) of the Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 189 (2009).  But these articles 
do not attempt to incorporate collateral consequences into criminal procedure; 
they instead seek to dramatically expand one procedural entitlement (the right 
to counsel) in part because of the rise of collateral consequences of conviction. 
 17. See Crane, supra note 10, at 829–31 (describing the salutary effects 
incorporation of collateral consequences would have on the criminal justice 
system).  In fact, I explicitly left unanswered several key questions about 
incorporation that this Article now takes up.  See id. at 832–33. 
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Part III, which represents the heart of the Article, sets forth a 
three-step framework for incorporating collateral consequences into 
criminal procedure.  The first step is ascertaining the theory of 
allocation underlying the right at issue.  Under my approach, each 
procedural entitlement is examined individually—it is a 
right-by-right inquiry.  And the first step is identifying not only the 
line dividing those defendants who receive a particular right from 
those who do not but also the rationale for that dividing line.  That 
rationale will then inform how collateral consequences can be 
incorporated in a way that is consistent within and across existing 
doctrines. 
The second step is determining which collateral consequences are 
eligible for potentially triggering the right at issue.  As explained in 
more detail below, not every collateral consequence should be 
considered for each entitlement.  Rather, some collateral 
consequences should be excluded from consideration for a given right 
based on the allocation theory developed in step one.  In order to 
facilitate this step, I categorize collateral consequences along three 
different dimensions: whether the consequence is automatically 
imposed upon conviction, whether it is imposed by the same sovereign 
prosecuting the offense, and whether it applies uniformly to all 
defendants charged with a particular offense.18  By untangling the 
complexities of collateral consequences in this way, courts and 
legislatures will now have a handy guide for determining which 
collateral consequences should be considered and which should be 
excluded at step three. 
The third and final step is deciding whether an eligible collateral 
consequence is sufficiently severe to trigger the procedural 
entitlement at issue.  The main contribution here is the development 
of a rubric for assessing the relative severity of collateral 
consequences in terms of functional equivalent of prison time.19  
Because existing doctrines distribute procedural entitlements based 
on the metric of imprisonment, I offer a way for grading collateral 
consequences consistent with that metric, thereby easing concerns 
about incommensurability and slippery slopes. 
After setting forth my proposed framework, I then apply its 
insights to the two most hallowed rights in our criminal justice 
system: the constitutional right to counsel (Part IV) and the 
constitutional right to a jury trial (Part V).  These applications 
demonstrate how my methodology for incorporating collateral 
consequences can be applied in practice, providing courts and 
legislatures with a model for the incorporation of other rights that are 
distributed unevenly across defendants, such as the right to a 
preliminary hearing, to a grand jury, and to heightened discovery 
from the government. 
 
 18. See infra Subpart IV.B. 
 19. See infra Subpart IV.C. 
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II.  THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 
This Part details the curious relationship that currently exists 
between collateral consequences and procedural entitlements.  
Subpart A provides some basic background about collateral 
consequences—what they are and how they are triggered by criminal 
convictions.  For ease of exposition, this Article focuses on four leading 
collateral consequences: immigration consequences, sex offender 
registration and notification requirements, firearm prohibitions, and 
disqualifications from public benefits. 
Subpart B describes how collateral consequences are deeply 
enmeshed in the criminal justice system, including the ways in which 
they impact and influence defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors, 
and judges.  It also explains that, despite the degree to which 
collateral consequences are intertwined with the criminal justice 
system, they are not integrated into the determination of which 
procedural entitlements a defendant receives. 
Subpart C then posits that a primary reason why courts and 
legislatures have thus far declined to consider collateral consequences 
when allocating procedural entitlements is because of the 
line-drawing difficulties and incommensurability issues raised by the 
prospect of incorporating collateral consequences into criminal 
procedure—the precise complications this Article seeks to ameliorate. 
A. Understanding Collateral Consequences 
The legal consequences that flow from a criminal conviction are 
typically divided into two groups: direct and collateral.20  Direct 
consequences are those sanctions that fall “within the sentencing 
authority of the state [or federal] trial court.”21  They include the 
 
 20. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 678.  Criminal convictions also have 
significant nonlegal consequences, including adverse effects on private 
employment prospects and various forms of social stigma.  See John Bronsteen et 
al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1049–54 (2009).  See 
generally Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 
1103 (2013) (describing the growing concern over collateral consequences to 
criminal convictions); Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2 at 624–25 
n.1 (2006) (listing many sources that address this issue); Travis, supra note 11 
(describing the various negative impacts of collateral consequences on multiple 
types of offenders).  Although the term “collateral consequences” has occasionally 
been used to refer to nonlegal consequences, my use of the phrase is limited to a 
conviction’s legally-imposed consequences.  See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE § 1:8 (2016). 
 21. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364.  Commentators have similarly emphasized the 
role and authority of the sentencing court when attempting to delineate the realm 
of collateral consequences.  See LOVE ET AL., supra note 20 (“[W]e endorse 
‘collateral consequences’ as a generally serviceable (if not entirely precise) term 
to describe the range of legal penalties and disabilities that flow from a criminal 
conviction over and above the sentence imposed by the court.”). 
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punishments most often associated with criminal convictions—
sanctions such as imprisonment, fines, and probation.22  A collateral 
consequence, by contrast, is any sanction or disability imposed by law 
as a result of a criminal conviction that is in addition to the 
conviction’s direct consequences.23  In other words, collateral 
consequences “are not part of the explicit punishment handed down 
by the court; they stem from the fact of conviction rather than from 
the sentence of the court.”24 
While there are scores of various collateral consequences that 
might flow from a criminal conviction,25 this Article, for ease of 
explication, focuses on four types of collateral consequences: (1) 
immigration consequences; (2) sanctions imposed on sex offenders; (3) 
firearm prohibitions; and (4) disqualification from various public 
benefits, such as public housing, food assistance, and other forms of 
financial aid.  I focus on these four categories for several reasons.  To 
begin, each of these consequences can have a significant impact on a 
defendant—and when imposed is often the most important result of 
a criminal conviction.26  In addition, each of these consequences 
applies to a large number of individuals every year; these are not 
consequences suffered by a trivial few.27  Finally, each of these 
consequences can flow from a conviction for a misdemeanor offense.  
A defendant charged and convicted of a misdemeanor receives fewer 
procedural entitlements than his or her felony counterpart,28 and 
under existing law that procedural disparity persists even if the 
misdemeanor defendant faces one of these significant collateral 
consequences.  Each of these four types of consequences will be 
discussed in turn. 
1. Immigration Consequences 
The laws governing deportation were largely overhauled in the 
1990s.29  Among other things, Congress “increased the number of 
 
 22. Roberts, supra note 2, at 680. 
 23. See, e.g., Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, 
§ 510(d), 121 Stat. 2534, 2544 (2008); UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONVICTION ACT § 2(1)–(2) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2010). 
 24. Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2, at 634. 
 25. See National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUST. 
CTR: THE COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2019). 
 26. See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 (“[D]eportation is an integral part—
indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed 
on noncitizen defendants . . . .”). 
 27. Crane, supra note 10, at 785, 790–93. 
 28. Id. at 802. 
 29. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; Immigration Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050.  Congress first made certain 
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crimes triggering deportation.”30  Most relevant here, Congress 
significantly expanded the number of misdemeanor offenses that 
render a noncitizen deportable.31  For example, Congress made a 
conviction for any offense “relating to a controlled substance” (subject 
to one narrow exception involving minor marijuana possession) 
grounds for deportation.32  Congress likewise made a wide swath of 
offenses involving domestic violence and child abuse, including 
misdemeanor offenses under state law, grounds for deportation.33  As 
a result, a large number of “misdemeanors—a category of crimes 
where those convicted often serve no jail time—can lead to removal,”34 
meaning many “noncitizens are subject to the severe penalty of 
deportation even for convictions for minor crimes.”35 
While a criminal conviction for a qualifying offense renders the 
noncitizen defendant deportable, the process of removal—and 
whether the defendant is in fact removed—takes place outside the 
criminal justice system.36  Removal proceedings, which are civil in 
nature, are initiated at the discretion of the Department of Homeland 
Security, and the removal proceeding is overseen by an immigration 
judge appointed by the Attorney General.37  The immigration judge 
determines whether the defendant has violated a provision of the 
immigration laws and, if so, whether he or she should be ordered 
 
criminal convictions a basis for deportation in 1917.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361 
(describing the enactment of The Immigration Act of 1917). 
 30. See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1444 n.93 (2005); see also Juliet Stumpf, Fitting 
Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1722–25 (2009) (exemplifying specific 
examples of crimes that result in deportation). 
 31. See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in 
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758–63 (2012); Clapman, supra 
note 15, at 591; Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CAL. L. REV. 553, 
560–61 (2013).  Congress also eliminated most statutory forms of relief and 
abolished a sentencing court’s ability to prevent deportation through a procedure 
known as a “judicial recommendation against deportation.”  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
361–64; see also Mikos, supra note 30 (“These amendments . . . eliminated most 
statutory means of relief.”). 
 32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368; 
Cade, supra note 28, at 1760. 
 33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). 
 34. Lee, supra note 31, at 561. 
 35. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 2:47 n.6.  Indeed, many removals are in fact 
based on misdemeanor convictions.  See, e.g., Heidi Altman, Prosecuting 
Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for Noncitizen, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 14 (2012). 
 36. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (explaining that “removal proceedings are civil 
in nature”). 
 37. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, §2:48 (“DHS is in charge of immigration 
benefits such as work visas and gaining citizenship, the enforcement of 
immigration laws, and border security among other matters.”). 
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removed from the United States.38  In so doing, the immigration judge 
may consider various forms of discretionary relief—but only if such 
relief is available under federal law.39  Most noncitizens convicted of 
a criminal offense rendering them deportable are ineligible for such 
discretionary relief.40  Accordingly, as the Supreme Court 
summarized in Padilla v. Kentucky,41 “[u]nder contemporary law, if a 
non-citizen has committed a removable offense . . . his removal is 
practically inevitable.”42 
Immigration law is famously complex, and I do not mean to skirt 
some of those complexities with my brief discussion here.43  Rather, 
for purposes of this Article, the bottom line when it comes to 
immigration consequences is straightforward: many minor offenses, 
including offenses where the defendant faces little or no jail time, can 
render a noncitizen deportable from the United States upon his or her 
conviction.  And, under existing law, his or her eventual removal from 
the United States, through a civil process distinct from the criminal 
justice system, will often be “practically inevitable” after a conviction 
for a deportable offense.44 
2. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Requirements 
Another type of significant collateral consequence is that imposed 
on convicted sex offenders.  All fifty states, the District of Columbia, 
and the federal government have laws requiring convicted sex 
offenders to “register with the police upon release from prison” and 
laws establishing community notification systems, such as ones 
through the Internet, about registered sex offenders.45  And, critically 
 
 38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2012) (“At the conclusion of the proceeding 
the immigration judge shall decide whether an alien is removable from the 
United States.”). 
 39. See Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
611, 616 (2005). 
 40. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364. 
 41. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 42. Id. at 363–64. 
 43. For more in-depth treatment of the immigration consequences of 
criminal convictions, see the sources collected by Love and her coauthors.  LOVE 
ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 2:47–2:59. 
 44. Padilla, 599 U.S. at 363–64. 
 45. Travis, supra note 11, at 22; see Kevin G. Buckler & Lawrence F. Travis 
III, Reanalyzing the Prevalence and Social Context of Collateral Consequence 
Statutes, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 435, 443 (2003); Lori McPherson, The Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) at 10 Years: History, Implementation, 
and the Future, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 747 n.16 (2016).  Much like immigration, 
the 1990s was a defining period for sex offender registration and notification 
requirements.  In 1986, only four states had laws requiring certain sex offenders 
to register; by 1998, all jurisdictions had such laws.  Buckler & Travis, supra note 
45, at 443; Travis, supra note 11, at 21–22; see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, 
§2:39 (“While registration and community notification laws, often known 
eponymously by the names of child victims sparking their enactment, originated 
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for purposes of this Article, the vast majority of jurisdictions include 
some misdemeanors in their lists of registerable offenses.46  In 
addition, sex offender registration and notification requirements 
typically apply automatically upon conviction of a registerable 
offense, as defined by the pertinent jurisdiction.47  Registration and 
notification periods range from fifteen years to life, depending on the 
jurisdiction and qualifying offense.48 
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) is 
the guiding federal legislation for sex offender registration and 
notification laws.49  SORNA is not mandatory on the states, but there 
are substantial penalties for noncompliance.50  SORNA sets minimum 
standards for sex offender registration and notification laws adopted 
by the states, and thus provides a representative example of the types 
of requirements imposed on convicted sex offenders across the 
country.  For example, pursuant to SORNA, a sex offender must 
provide his or her name, Social Security number, license plate 
numbers, descriptions of his or her vehicles, and the address of his or 
her residence to the registering jurisdiction.51  Offenders must also 
provide the name and address of any place he or she is employed or is 
enrolled as a student,52 and he or she must provide information about 
 
only in the early- to mid-1990s, they today affect hundreds of thousands of 
individuals nationwide.”). 
 46. See King, supra note 16, at 28; Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors 
Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 277, 298–99 (2011); see also, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a (McKinney 
2011) (listing five misdemeanors as registerable offenses). 
 47. See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification 
Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 885, 889 (1995). 
 48. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of 
Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 
1087 (2012) (“Today, a tier I offender [the least serious offender] generally must 
register for a minimum of fifteen years or, often, twenty years.  Additionally, 
many more crimes today have been assigned lifetime registration or recast to 
require lifetime registration.”).  Pursuant to SORNA, offenders are sorted into 
tiers based on the offense of conviction.  Tier I offenders have a full registration 
period of fifteen years.  Tier II and III offenders have a full registration period of 
twenty-five years and life, respectively.  The registration periods can be reduced 
for Tier II and Tier III offenders.  42 U.S.C. § 16915(a) (2012). 
 49. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, 120 Stat. 587.  For a detailed explanation of the history of sex offender 
registration laws, see generally McPherson, supra note 45 (discussing the 
ramifications of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 16912(a)–(b).  States that have not implemented SORNA 
provisions within the specified timetable forfeit ten percent of the funds normally 
allocated to them under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.  
However, noncompliance is excused if the state acted in good faith to implement 
the program.  42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) (“[A] jurisdiction that fails . . . to substantially 
implement this subchapter shall not receive ten percent of the funds that would 
otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 51. Id. § 16914(a). 
 52. Id. 
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any travel outside of the United States.53  Offenders must also 
regularly update this information if any changes occur,54 and he or 
she must also appear in person for a new photograph and to verify 
information every three months to one year, depending on their 
classification status.55 
As for the “notification” aspect of sex offender laws, much of the 
information collected during the registration process is made publicly 
available via the Internet.56  For example, a website run by the federal 
government allows users to enter a zip code or geographical region 
and obtain “relevant information,” which includes the offender’s 
name, addresses of his or her residence and employment, a physical 
description, offenses, and a photograph.57  Each state has its own 
similar website and notification methods, containing similar and 
sometimes more detailed information about registered sex 
offenders.58 
Conviction for a registerable sex offense also triggers related 
consequences involving residential restrictions, such as prohibitions 
on living within a certain distance of a school or any place where 
children may congregate, and restrictions on potential employment.59  
“[S]everal dozen states,” moreover, “have started using global 
 
 53. Information Required for Notice of International Travel, OFF. OF SEX 
OFFENDER, SENT’G, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING, AND TRACKING, 
https://smart.gov/international_travel.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2019); see LOVE ET 
AL., supra note 20, § 2:39 (“Registrants must provide authorities with a 
considerable of amount of information. . . .”). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c) (2012) (requiring a registrant to update their 
information within three days of a change of name, address, employment, or 
student status, and requires the person to appear in at least one of the 
jurisdictions). 
 55. Id. § 16916.  The periods are as follows: every year for Tier I offenders, 
six months for Tier II offenders, and every three months for Tier III offenders. 
SORNA also requires states to implement a criminal penalty for offenders who 
fail to comply with the registration requirements.  42 U.S.C. § 16913(e).  In 
addition, an offender who “knowingly fails to register or update a registration as 
required” can be charged with a federal offense that authorizes up to ten years of 
imprisonment.  18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3) (2012). 
 56. See 34 U.S.C. § 20921 (2012) (requiring the attorney general to maintain 
a national database of all sex offenders); National Sex Offender Search, NSOPW, 
https://www.nsopw.gov/en/search/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). 
 57. See National Sex Offender Search, supra note 56. 
 58. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Sex Offender Search, MEGAN’S L. WEBSITE, 
https://www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (allowing users 
to search for registered sex offenders in Pennsylvania and providing their name, 
address, height, weight, race, birth year, identifying marks, and offense 
committed). 
 59. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 2:43; see also Wayne A. Logan, 
Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 1, 6–7, 13–14 (2006) (noting that at least eighteen states restrict 
registered sex offenders from living within a certain distance of schools, usually 
between 500 and 2,000 feet). 
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positioning satellite (GPS) or other tracking technology to monitor sex 
offenders after their release from confinement.”60 
In sum, a defendant convicted of a qualifying sex offense, 
including a qualifying misdemeanor offense, will automatically upon 
conviction be subjected to a suite of significant collateral 
consequences involving registration requirements, community 
notification, residential and employment restrictions, and potential 
government monitoring by GPS. 
3. Firearm Prohibitions 
Congress first forbade the possession of firearms by certain 
criminal offenders in 1938,61 and eventually prohibited all felons from 
possessing a firearm in 1968.62  It did not limit the ability of 
misdemeanants to possess firearms, however, until 1996.63  Congress 
made it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court 
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to purchase or possess 
a firearm that has travelled in interstate commerce.64  In addition to 
the federal ban, fifteen states and the District of Columbia currently 
prohibit the possession of firearms by persons convicted of 
misdemeanor domestic violence offenses.65  Firearm prohibitions 
 
 60. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 2:44 (“While most laws are limited in their 
application to probation and parole periods, several subject sex offenders to 
lifetime electronic monitoring and require reimbursement of monitoring costs.”); 
see also Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 48, at 1098–99 (noting that GPS 
monitoring is a recent addition to registration schemes that allows law 
enforcement to track sex offenders after release from confinement). 
 61. See Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938); 
Conrad Kahn, Challenging the Federal Prohibition on Gun Possession by 
Nonviolent Felons, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 113–14 (2013). 
 62. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197; Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213; see 
also C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun? 32 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 695, 698 (2009). 
 63. See Mikos, supra note 30, at 1457 n.153 (discussing Congress’s desire to 
prevent gun possession by misdemeanor domestic violence offenders). 
 64. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 
658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); see also 
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) (2012) (defining a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence” to include state and federal misdemeanor offenses). 
Under federal law, the definition of a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence’ is complex.  A qualifying conviction must involve an offense 
that “is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law” and that 
“has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the 
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former 
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the 
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or 
has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a 
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.” 
LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 2:30 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)). 
 65. See Domestic Violence & Firearms, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-firearms-policy-summary/ 
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typically apply automatically and immediately upon conviction of a 
qualifying offense; there is no separate administrative process 
required to implement this collateral consequence of conviction.66 
4. Disqualification from Public Benefits 
 Criminal convictions can preclude a defendant from accessing a 
wide range of public benefits.  As Brian Murray has summarized, 
“[c]onvictions can lead to ineligibility for unemployment benefits, loss 
of retirement benefits for public officials, and disqualification from 
welfare, cash assistance, and medical assistance.  They also can result 
in forcible eviction from public housing, and the inability to live with 
someone, related or unrelated, who is seeking child custody.”67  These 
consequences can be imposed under state or federal law, and many 
can be triggered by a misdemeanor conviction.68 
For example, with respect to public housing benefits, the landlord 
or relevant public housing agency can terminate a person’s lease for 
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right 
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants, any 
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to 
peaceful enjoyment of their residences by persons residing in 
the immediate vicinity of the premises, or any drug-related 
criminal activity on or near such premises, engaged in by a 
tenant of any unit, any member of the tenant’s household, or 
any guest or other person under the tenant’s control.69 
 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2019).  Several states have enacted bans where a 
misdemeanor offense triggers a period of prohibition on firearm possession.  See, 
e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.713 (West 2016) (prohibition for three years in cases 
of crimes of violence or where a person has been convicted at the “gross 
misdemeanor level”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(5) (McKinney 2013) (prohibition, 
for five years, on possessing a firearm outside the home or place of business after 
conviction of a class A misdemeanor). 
 66. AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: 
JUDICIAL BENCH BOOK 6–7 (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants 
/251583.pdf. 
 67. Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel: Increasing Notice of 
Collateral Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1153–54 (2015); see also LOVE 
ET AL., supra note 20, §2:18 (“Conviction can lead to loss of welfare benefits under 
both state and federal law.  The most common programs affected by conviction 
are the federally funded but state-administered Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).  
TANF provides temporary financial assistance to pregnant women and to 
families with children.  TANF funds can assist recipients in paying for housing, 
food, and utilities.  SNAP, also known as the food stamp program, provides 
subsidies to low-income individuals and families to purchase food.”). 
 68. See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 1109.92(c)(1) (2015) (providing that persons 
convicted of a first-degree felony forfeit their right to public medical benefits for 
any period of incarceration). 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).  For the purposes of this Section, 
drug-related criminal activity refers to “the illegal manufacture, sale, 
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With respect to medical assistance (e.g., Medicare), a person can be 
denied access to medical benefit programs for any “criminal offense 
consisting of a misdemeanor relating to fraud, theft, embezzlement, 
breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial misconduct” or 
for any “criminal offense consisting of a misdemeanor relating to the 
unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a 
controlled substance.”70 
The loss of such public benefits does not typically apply 
automatically after a pertinent criminal conviction, but rather 
depends on the implementation and discretion of some public 
administrative body—such as a public housing authority or relevant 
health care agency.71 
B. The Curious Relationship Between Collateral Consequences and 
Criminal Procedural Entitlements 
1. The Relevance of Collateral Consequences to Criminal 
Justice 
Collateral consequences are an integral part of the American 
criminal justice system.  As explained above, criminal convictions can 
trigger numerous and significant collateral consequences.  But that is 
just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the impact collateral 
consequences have on the criminal justice system.  Collateral 
consequences affect many parties to the criminal justice process—
defendants most of all, but also defense attorneys, prosecutors, and 
judges.  Collateral consequences also influence many aspects of the 
criminal justice process, including charging decisions, plea 
bargaining, and sentencing. 
 
distribution, use, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or use 
a controlled substance.”  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(5). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(a)(4), (b)(1) (2012). 
 71. See, e.g., LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 2:17–2:18. A similar set of 
collateral consequences relate to occupational and professional licenses.  A 
panoply of state and federal laws prohibits persons with certain qualifying 
convictions, including convictions for some misdemeanor offenses, from being 
employed in a wide variety of fields—everything from barbers to bank tellers.  
Similarly, 
[v]arious occupations with [state] licensing boards are given broad 
discretion to refuse licenses to an applicant with a felony or 
misdemeanor conviction.  These same boards are often required by law 
to consider convictions and sometimes are prohibited from issuing a 
license to individuals with certain convictions, irrespective of that 
individual’s rehabilitation post-conviction or the underlying facts in the 
case. 
Murray, supra note 67, at 1150–51 (citations omitted).  Some of the prohibitions 
are mandatory; some are discretionary.  But the bottom line is the same: a 
conviction, including conviction for a misdemeanor offense, can result in the 
defendant being prohibited from his or her occupational field. 
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With respect to defendants, collateral consequences are typically 
the most important result of a criminal conviction.72  This is because 
collateral consequences of conviction “are frequently more punitive 
and long-lasting than court-imposed sanctions like a prison term or 
fine.”73  And this will be true for most defendants processed through 
the criminal justice system: “[F]or most people convicted of crimes, 
collateral consequences will generate the most significant effects.”74  
This reality—that collateral consequences are usually the most 
important part of any criminal conviction—has a ripple effect on 
nearly every other corner of the criminal justice process. 
For example, as a wide and still burgeoning literature recognizes, 
a primary role and responsibility of a defense attorney is to advise his 
or her client about collateral consequences and assist that client in 
navigating such consequences.75  “[C]ompetent defense lawyers must 
now be informed about the range of collateral consequences 
potentially affecting their clients, be prepared to bargain with the 
prosecutor about them, seek to shape the disposition of the case 
around them, and advise the client about how to mitigate them after 
judgment.”76  Indeed, “[c]onsideration of the full range of [collateral] 
 
 72. See Chin, supra note 2, at 152, 154 (“[C]ollateral consequences, not fine 
or imprisonment, are the most significant consequences in criminal cases.”); see 
also Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 700 (“The real work of the conviction is 
performed by the collateral consequences.”); Robert M. A. Johnson, A Prosecutor’s 
Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 132 
(2011) (“The civil consequences of a criminal conviction are often far greater than 
any consequence imposed by a judge at sentencing.”). 
 73. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 1:2; Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 699–
700 (observing that, in most criminal cases, “[t]he collateral consequences are a 
far more meaningful result of such a conviction” and that “traditional sanctions 
such as fine or imprisonment are comparatively insignificant”); Crane, supra note 
10, at 779 (“Although incarceration terms for low-level convictions typically top 
out at a couple of months—and rarely more than a few years—several key 
collateral consequences last for decades or even life.”). 
 74. Chin, supra note 2, at 154. 
 75. See, e.g., McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not A Bad Word: A Criminal 
Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy 
Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 497 (2005) [hereinafter Smyth, Not a Bad Word] 
(explaining that defense attorneys are required to inform their clients about the 
effects of “hidden sanctions” and collateral consequences before accepting a guilty 
plea); see also Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating 
Collateral Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1072–76, 1078, 1080 (2004) (arguing that the “holistic 
approach” to defense representation has overlooked collateral consequences and 
it must incorporate collateral consequences in order to truly be effective); 
McGregor Smyth, “Collateral” No More: The Practical Imperative for Holistic 
Defense in a Post-Padilla World . . . Or, How to Achieve Consistently Better Results 
for Clients, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 139, 141–42, 144 (2011) [hereinafter 
Smyth, “Collateral” No More] (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of defense counsel informing their clients of potential collateral 
consequences when deciding on accepting a plea). 
 76. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 1:15; see, e.g., Chin, supra note 14, at 689 
(“The only stable principle is that counsel must strive to advise about all 
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consequences for clients and their families should be a critical part of 
defense inquiry and strategy at every stage of representation, from the 
first client meeting to sentencing.”77 
Collateral consequences also have a significant influence on 
prosecutors, particularly in relatively low-level cases (that is, cases 
involving misdemeanors and low-grade felonies).  In some such cases 
prosecutors will charge particular offenses with the specific and 
primary aim of imposing a collateral consequence that is triggered by 
that offense.78  In other cases, prosecutors will charge particular 
offenses (or decline to charge particular offenses) in order to avoid 
triggering specific collateral consequences they believe would be an 
unjust or unnecessary sanction.79  But the bottom line in both 
contexts is the same: prosecutors often consider collateral 
consequences when deciding what charges, if any, to file in a 
particular case. 
Collateral consequences likewise influence plea bargaining 
between prosecutors and defense counsel.80  Professional standards of 
 
important and applicable collateral consequences.  The advice must then be both 
comprehensive and specific; it must focus on the important consequences without 
failing to warn about all of them—it must simultaneously be thick and thin.”). 
 77. Smyth, “Collateral” No More, supra note 75, at 156 (emphasis added). 
 78. See generally Crane, supra note 10, at 778–79 (explaining that attaching 
collateral consequences to misdemeanor offenses provide prosecutors with 
incentives to charge “borderline” crimes as misdemeanors rather than felonies); 
see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 699 (“[T]he imposition of collateral 
consequences has become an increasingly central purpose of the modern criminal 
process.”); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of 
Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126, 1187 (2013) (discussing 
how “immigration consequences are [often] an express prosecutorial goal of the 
conviction” in Maricopa County, Arizona). 
 79. Academic literature is full of such anecdotes and hypotheticals.  See, e.g., 
Catherine A. Christian, Awareness of Collateral Consequences: The Role of the 
Prosecutor, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 621, 622 (2006) (arguing that 
prosecutors must consider the impact of collateral consequences such as “Civil 
Asset Forfeiture Programs,” and only pursue them when it would ensure justice 
is achieved); Smyth, Not a Bad Word, supra note 75, at 494–96 (showing that 
when individuals charged with minor crimes would be subject to 
disproportionately harsh collateral consequences, prosecutors have allowed pleas 
for lesser offenses); see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 8:3, 8:7.  These types 
of charging decisions are especially pronounced in discussions involving 
deportation.  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 31, at 579 (noting instances when 
prosecutors have been willing to charge crimes as misdemeanors instead of 
felonies when the collateral consequences of the felony could result in the 
defendant being deported). 
 80. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 8:6 (“Integrating collateral 
consequences into plea bargaining is consistent with constitutional, ethical, and 
professional standards.”); see also Altman, supra note 35, at 23 (“There are 
various ways in which the prosecution and defense may shape a plea agreement 
to achieve one or more of these immigration-related goals.”). 
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conduct for both prosecutors81 and defense attorneys82 recommend 
that collateral consequences be considered when negotiating and 
shaping plea bargains.  And the reasoning underneath such ethical 
standards is obvious: “Without considering collateral consequences, 
lawyers cannot effectively advise their clients about the risks and 
benefits of pleading guilty, and cannot effectively negotiate the terms 
of guilty pleas.”83  Because “collateral consequences in many 
instances are what is really at stake” in a criminal case, it should 
come as no surprise that potential collateral consequences are often 
a—if not the—focal point of negotiations over a criminal case’s 
disposition.84 
In the context of sentencing, collateral consequences may also be 
considered by judges and can influence the ultimate sentence they 
impose on the defendant.  Indeed, considering collateral consequences 
“at sentencing is consistent with the idea—expressed not only in 
sentencing theory but also in many jurisdictions’ statutory 
directives—that sentences must be proportionate to the offense and 
consistent with general fairness principles.”85  Accordingly, various 
standards and codes of conduct, such as the American Bar 
Association’s (“ABA”) Criminal Justice Standards, direct courts to 
consider “applicable collateral sanctions in determining an offender’s 
overall sentence.”86  And many courts have explicitly reached the 
same conclusion.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, for example, has held that district judges must consider 
collateral consequences during sentencing, observing that it “is 
difficult to see how a court can properly calibrate a ‘just punishment’ 
[one of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)87] if it does 
not consider the collateral effects of a particular sentence.”88 
 
 81. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 8:7 (“Consideration of collateral 
consequences is recommended in professional standards for prosecutors.”). 
 82. Id. § 8:6 (“A variety of professional standards recommend that defense 
counsel bargain about collateral consequences that are significant to a client’s 
interests, since plea discussions may be a criminal defendant’s first and only 
opportunity to avoid collateral consequences.”). 
 83. Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 736. 
 84. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, Prefatory Note at 
4 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). 
 85. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 8:19. 
 86. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSON § 19-2.4(a) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N, 3d ed. 2004). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
 88. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 141 (2d Cir. 2009).  But see United 
States v. Morgan, 635 F. App’x. 423, 446 (10th Cir. 2015) (identifying circuit split 
on whether federal district courts should consider collateral consequences when 
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
For one prominent example of a district judge imposing a sentence deeply 
influenced by the collateral consequences a defendant faced, see United States v. 
Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Chevelle Nesbeth was 
convicted by a jury of importation of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent 
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In sum, collateral consequences are inextricably intertwined with 
most aspects of the criminal justice system.  They can, and often do, 
substantially impact defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and 
judges.  And because collateral consequences are such an important 
part of many criminal cases, they can, and often do, significantly 
affect charging decisions, plea negotiations, and a case’s ultimate 
disposition. 
2. The Current Irrelevance of Collateral Consequences to 
Criminal Procedure 
While collateral consequences may be integral to many aspects of 
the criminal justice process, one place they have not been integrated 
is the distribution of criminal procedural entitlements.  In fact, given 
how enmeshed collateral consequences are in the criminal justice 
system, they play a surprisingly small role in the allocation of 
procedural entitlements to criminal defendants. 
To begin, it is important to recognize that not all criminal 
defendants receive the same fleet of procedural protections when 
facing criminal prosecution.89  Indeed, the vast majority of criminal 
defendants receive something less than a jurisdiction’s most 
protective bundle of procedural rights.90  For example, only some 
defendants receive the right to counsel,91 only some defendants have 
a right to a preliminary hearing or grand jury,92 only some defendants 
 
to distribute.  Her advisory guidelines sentencing range was 33-41 months.  
Nonetheless, I rendered a non-incarceratory sentence today in part because of a 
number of statutory and regulatory collateral consequences she will face as a 
convicted felon.  I have incorporated those consequences in the balancing of the 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in imposing a one-year probationary sentence.”). 
 89. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.8(c) (4th ed. 
2015) (“Every jurisdiction provides for some procedural differences based upon a 
distinction between major and minor crimes.”); see also Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2012).  Some procedural 
entitlements do apply uniformly.  For example, in all cases the government must 
establish each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).  And several trial rights, such as those 
guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause, apply to all criminal prosecutions, 
including misdemeanors.  See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth 
Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 538 (2009). 
 90. See Natapoff, supra note 89, at 1350 (“If the United States Supreme 
Court can be said to have a misdemeanor theory, it is that lesser punishments 
should trigger reduced procedural entitlements.”).  Misdemeanors account for 
over eighty percent of all criminal cases, with recent estimates placing the total 
number of misdemeanor cases at about ten million per year.  Id. at 1320.  In other 
words, if the criminal justice system were a car wash, relatively few defendants 
would be afforded the “gold package” of procedural entitlements. 
 91. Id. at 1340. 
 92. See Gabriel J. Chin & John Ormonde, Infamous Misdemeanors and the 
Grand Jury Clause, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1911, 1911–12 (2018). 
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are entitled to the most fulsome degree of discovery,93 and only some 
defendants may demand a jury trial.94 
Given this reality, how procedural protections are allocated—and 
to whom they are in fact distributed—is critically important.  The 
main dividing line when it comes to allocating procedural 
entitlements is whether the defendant is charged with a felony or a 
misdemeanor offense.95  Defendants charged with a felony, which is 
an offense that authorizes more than one-year imprisonment upon 
conviction,96 receive a jurisdiction’s most protective bundle of 
entitlements.  Defendants charged with a misdemeanor, which is an 
offense that authorizes one year or less imprisonment upon 
conviction,97 receive a less protective bundle of procedural 
protections.  In other words, the determination of whether a 
defendant receives the “gold package” of procedural protections turns 
on a single metric: the potential term of imprisonment that defendant 
faces. 
As I have detailed elsewhere, “an offense’s collateral 
consequences, no matter how severe, are generally deemed irrelevant 
for determining what procedural safeguards apply.  In other words, a 
misdemeanor that threatens a severe collateral consequence is 
classified the same as any other misdemeanor in a jurisdiction’s 
criminal justice system.”98  Accordingly, depending on the 
jurisdiction, many misdemeanor defendants—including 
misdemeanor defendants facing severe collateral consequences like 
deportation or sex offender registration—will not be entitled to our 
legal system’s most hallowed procedural protections, like the right to 
counsel and the right to demand a jury trial.99 
The current relationship between collateral consequences and 
criminal procedures therefore presents something of a puzzle.  
Although collateral consequences are increasingly recognized as 
 
 93. Crane, supra note 10, at 780. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See discussion infra Subpart IV.A.  A defendant’s right to counsel and 
right to demand a jury trial are a little more complicated than the 
felony-misdemeanor divide that governs nearly every other procedural 
entitlement that is not uniformly distributed across defendants.  But the main 
point for now is this: all felony defendants receive the right to counsel and right 
to a jury trial, while only some misdemeanor defendants receive the right to 
counsel and the right to a jury trial. 
 96. Crane, supra note 10, at 786. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 796; see Clapman, supra note 15, at 602–03 (explaining that a 
defendant’s right to counsel is not affected by the possibility of a severe collateral 
consequence upon conviction); see also Crane, supra note 10, at 800–11 (detailing 
how the right to a grand jury, the right to a preliminary hearing, the right to 
discovery, and the right to a jury trial are not affected by the possibility of a 
severe collateral consequence upon conviction). 
 99. See discussion infra Subparts IV.A., V.A. 
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“central” to the criminal justice process,100 they are effectively ignored 
when it comes to the allocation of criminal procedural entitlements 
across defendants.  The next Subpart analyzes some of the reasons 
why this curious state of affairs continues to persist. 
C. Cracks, But Not Breaks, in the Wall Separating Collateral 
Consequences and Criminal Procedure 
This Subpart analyzes why collateral consequences, despite 
playing a central role in the criminal justice system, are not accounted 
for when allocating procedural entitlements.  In particular, it 
identifies a key and oft-overlooked reason for this curious state of 
affairs: the prospect of incorporating collateral consequences into 
criminal procedure presents conceptually tricky and doctrinally 
difficult line-drawing issues, thereby discouraging courts and 
legislatures from departing from the prison-centric status quo. 
Before diving further into that reason, however, a few other 
possibilities need to be addressed.  One possible explanation—that 
collateral consequences are not that important—can be quickly 
dismissed.  As discussed above, collateral consequences are now a 
critical part of the criminal justice process.  Another possibility—that 
criminal justice actors, including courts and legislatures, are not yet 
aware of the significance of collateral consequences in the criminal 
justice system—is similarly unavailing.  While that lack of awareness 
may have been true decades ago (if it was ever true at all), the 
increasingly important role of collateral consequences has been well 
documented by courts and commentators alike.101 
Another possibility—that there is a “doctrinal wall” separating 
collateral consequences from criminal procedure rules—requires a 
little more attention.  Indeed, I suspect that this explanation, that 
collateral consequences simply fall “outside” the procedural rules 
governing criminal cases, is the reason most criminal justice 
observers would suggest first for why collateral consequences are 
rarely considered when it comes to distributing procedural 
entitlements. 102 
To be sure, there are several criminal justice doctrines that have 
excluded collateral consequences from their scope.  For example, 
courts have repeatedly held that collateral consequences are 
effectively outside the reach of the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto 
 
 100. See Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2, at 684 (2006) (“An 
integrated perspective . . . recognizes the centrality of collateral consequences to 
the criminal process. . . .”). 
 101. See United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); 
see also Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 
1197 (2016). 
 102. See Crane, supra note 10, at 778 n.2. 
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prohibitions103 and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause,104 on the grounds that collateral consequences 
are not “punishment” as required by those proscriptions.105 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences first gained legal 
prominence in the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. United 
States,106 which considered a trial court’s obligations when accepting 
a defendant’s guilty plea.107  In Brady, the Supreme Court established 
that, in order to comply with the Due Process Clause’s voluntariness 
requirement, a trial court needs to ensure only that a defendant is 
aware of the “direct consequences” of conviction before entering a 
guilty plea.108  Consequently, under the rule established in Brady, a 
trial court has no obligation to inform a defendant of a conviction’s 
potential collateral consequences before it accepts the plea as valid.109  
And it is from Brady that a related and important doctrine began to 
flourish: when advising a client whether to accept a guilty plea, 
counsel need not inform that client about a conviction’s potential 
collateral consequences.110  (More on this doctrine in a moment.) 
There is thus surely something to the claim that collateral 
consequences have not been integrated into the allocation of 
procedural entitlements because they are not the sort of sanctions 
other constitutional rules consider when determining the scope of 
their own protections.  Indeed, I agree with that claim, at least as far 
as it goes.  I think that is one of the reasons why collateral 
consequences are generally not considered when distributing 
procedural entitlements. 
 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law 
shall be passed.”); Id. § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto 
Law. . . .”). 
 104. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that sex 
offender registration scheme is “nonpunitive, and its retroactive application does 
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause”); see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 3:7 
(collecting cases involving Ex Post Facto challenges); id. § 3:14 (collecting cases 
involving Cruel and Unusual Punishment challenges). 
 106. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 107. Id.; see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 706, 726–30 (discussing 
Brady v. United States). 
 108. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 
572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957)). 
 109. Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 726–30 (discussing trial court’s duty 
under Brady to ensure that a guilty plea is voluntary). 
 110. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 & n.9 (2010) (collecting cases 
for the proposition that “collateral consequences are outside the scope of 
representation required by the Sixth Amendment” (citation omitted)).  See 
generally Chin & Holmes, supra note 2 (discussing the collateral consequences 
rule); Roberts, supra note 7 (discussing the need to require a full disclosure of 
serious collateral consequences of guilty pleas). 
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What I seek to establish here, however, is that this explanation 
is not as persuasive, or comprehensive, as it might seem at first blush.  
To put it another way, the wall separating collateral consequences 
from procedural entitlements is not as high and not as impermeable 
as this explanation would suggest.  While there may not (yet) be 
breaks in that metaphorical wall, there are certainly many significant 
cracks.  In other words, there is in fact no strict separation between 
collateral consequences and procedural entitlements—and there 
never really has been.111 
For example, in a long line of cases that began in the 1940s, the 
Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant’s appeal of his 
conviction is not rendered moot by the completion of his sentence (that 
is, his “punishment”), so long as he remains subject to potential 
collateral consequences from the challenged conviction.112  And as the 
Supreme Court explained in Sibron v. New York113 in 1968, a 
defendant appealing his conviction need not establish “the actual 
existence of specific collateral consequences”—rather, it will “in effect 
[be] presumed” that collateral consequences of conviction exist.114  
This presumption, the Court pointed out, reflects “the obvious fact of 
life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral 
legal consequences.”115  Accordingly, “a criminal case is moot only if it 
is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal 
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged 
conviction,” a showing that rarely will be possible.116  Since Sibron, 
courts have “proceeded to accept the most generalized and 
hypothetical of consequences as sufficient to avoid mootness in 
challenges to [one’s] conviction” on appeal, even though his or her 
sentence has been completed.117  In other words, the Court has long 
recognized that a defendant’s procedural right to appeal his or her 
conviction is preserved against claims of mootness by the mere 
possibility of that conviction’s inevitable collateral consequences. 
Perhaps the most visible crack in the metaphorical wall dividing 
collateral consequences and procedural entitlements is the Supreme 
Court’s landmark opinion in Padilla in 2010.  Until Padilla, and as 
noted above, it was widely accepted that counsel need not advise a 
client about any potential collateral consequences of conviction before 
pleading guilty.  That understanding was significantly disrupted by 
Padilla.  In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the then-consensus 
 
 111. Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 699 (“The idea that collateral 
consequences are divorced from the criminal process has never really been 
true . . . .”). 
 112. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53–58 (1968) (summarizing earlier 
decisions). 
 113. Id. at 40. 
 114. Id. at 55. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 57. 
 117. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 10 (1998). 
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view that “the failure of defense counsel to advise the defendant of 
possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”118  Emphasizing “the seriousness of 
deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea,” the Court held that, 
under the Sixth Amendment, “counsel must inform her client whether 
his plea carries a risk of deportation.”119 
Critically, the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla was limited to 
immigration consequences.120  Recognizing that the Supreme Court 
itself had “never applied a distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable 
professional assistance’ required under Strickland,”121 the Court 
concluded that “[w]hether that distinction is appropriate is a question 
we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of 
deportation.”122  The Court therefore left to the lower courts the 
question of whether counsel has a constitutional obligation to advise 
his or her client about other (nonimmigration) collateral 
consequences of conviction.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, “since Padilla 
was decided there have been lower court rulings going both ways on 
the issue of whether its logic and reasoning extend counsel’s advisory 
obligations beyond deportation to other consequences of conviction 
that are not part of the court-imposed sentence.”123  In other words, 
the Court’s decision in Padilla added significant new cracks to the 
metaphorical wall, even if the wall was still left standing. 
Finally, and most pertinently for purposes of this Article, the 
Supreme Court has nodded towards the potential relevance of 
collateral consequences in the context of a defendant’s right to 
demand a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.  As will be explained 
in more detail in Part V, a defendant charged with a “petty” offense 
has no federal constitutional right to a jury trial.124  The lodestar for 
determining whether an offense is petty is the potential term of 
imprisonment it authorizes.125  An offense that threatens more than 
six months imprisonment is always considered nonpetty and 
automatically triggers a defendant’s right to trial by jury.126  
Conversely, an offense that carries a maximum term of imprisonment 
of six months or less is “presumed” to be petty.127  The presumption is 
 
 118. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 119. Id. at 374. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 365. 
 122. Id. 
 123. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:7 (collecting cases). 
 124. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); 
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970). 
 125. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541–42. 
 126. Id. at 542. 
 127. See id. at 543.  The Supreme Court has also clarified that the critical 
inquiry is whether any single offense authorizes a term of imprisonment in excess 
of six months.  Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 323–24 (1996). 
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rebutted, and the defendant has a right to a jury trial, “if he can 
demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in 
conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, 
are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that 
the offense in question is a ‘serious’ one.”128 
The Supreme Court’s reference to “additional statutory 
penalties” in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas129 suggests that at 
least some collateral consequences may be pertinent when 
determining whether a defendant has a federal constitutional right to 
a jury trial.130  Nevertheless, courts have routinely deemed several 
significant collateral consequences irrelevant to the Sixth 
Amendment calculus.131  Indeed, the leading criminal procedure 
treatise summarizes post-Blanton case law as follows: “Generally, in 
assessing whether an offense is petty or not, lower courts have agreed 
that only authorized statutory penalties are to be taken into account; 
collateral consequences do not count.  Significant additional 
penalties, it seems, will not trigger a jury right.”132  In other words, 
although the Supreme Court has indicated that an offense’s potential 
collateral consequences can theoretically trigger a defendant’s right 
to a jury trial, that possibility has remained largely theoretical. 
So why have courts declined to extend more broadly holdings like 
Blanton (jury trial) or Padilla (effective assistance of counsel) or 
Sibron (mootness), all of which recognize the relevance of collateral 
consequences to procedural entitlements?  One important and 
underappreciated reason is that such extension would require courts 
to engage in difficult line-drawing decisions given the 
incommensurability issues raised by collateral consequences.  Put 
another way, incorporating collateral consequences into procedural 
entitlements more broadly is complicated and potentially messy, and 
that reality alone is a significant impediment to lower courts 
expanding the cracks created by cases like Blanton and Padilla 
absent more forceful direction from the Supreme Court. 
Whatever one might think about procedural regimes based solely 
on the punishment of imprisonment,133 the use of a single metric 
lends itself to clear and easy-to-draw lines.  If, for example, a 
particular procedural entitlement turns exclusively on whether a 
defendant faces more or less than one year of imprisonment upon 
conviction, it is conceptually and administratively easy to know 
whether that defendant is in fact entitled to the procedural right at 
 
 128. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. 
 129. Id. at 541. 
 130. See Crane, supra note 10, at 808–09. 
 131. See id. at 809–10. 
 132. 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 89, § 22.1(b). 
 133. For my own views critiquing such regimes, see Crane, supra note 10, 
passim. 
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issue.  Collateral consequences, on the other hand, come in all shapes 
and sizes—and there are literally hundreds of them.134 
There is no single metric to compare the relative severity of 
different collateral consequences to one another or to the sanction of 
imprisonment.  Consider questions like the following: Is registration 
as a sex offender more or less severe than losing one’s professional 
license?  Is being precluded from possessing a firearm more or less 
severe than being disqualified from public housing or public food 
assistance?  Is deportation the functional equivalent of six months 
imprisonment?  Two years?  Five years?  Is lifetime registration as a 
sex offender, with all its attendant burdens, the functional equivalent 
of three months imprisonment?  Three years?  You get the point.  
There is no smooth and obvious “exchange rate” across all these 
various currencies. 
In addition to the incommensurability issues raised by 
incorporating collateral consequences, collateral consequences also 
vary across a number of different dimensions that do not exist when 
it comes to imprisonment.  For example, some collateral consequences 
are imposed by sovereigns other than the prosecuting jurisdiction.  
Should those be factored in?  Some collateral consequences apply only 
to some defendants, depending on their status or other personal 
characteristics.  Should those be considered?  These complexities 
merely add to judicial concerns about incommensurability and 
slippery slopes.135 
In short, there are cracks in the doctrinal walls separating 
collateral consequences and criminal procedures, but courts 
(especially lower courts) are understandably and predictably hesitant 
to widen those cracks given the incommensurability issues and 
line-drawing problems associated with incorporating collateral 
consequences.  The metric of imprisonment is simple and clean; 
 
 134. See, e.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 699–700 (listing examples of 
collateral consequences such as deportation, voter disenfranchisement, and loss 
of federal benefits). 
 135. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 390 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (claiming that the right recognized by the majority in Padilla “has no 
logical stopping point”); People v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168, 185–87 (N.Y. 2018) 
(Garcia, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the majority’s decision to extend the 
constitutional right to a jury trial to a defendant facing deportation “will prove 
unworkable” and “create a lack of predictability” going forward) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Judge Fisher of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals explicitly expressed these concerns during an oral argument in a recent 
case about whether a defendant has the right to a jury trial because a conviction 
would subject him to deportation.  See Oral Argument at 29:03–33:25, Bado v. 
United States, 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90tVZVSElzg (explicitly raising “slippery 
slope” concerns about recognizing a right to a jury trial for a defendant subject to 
deportation upon conviction and stating that such a holding would lead to “quite 
a crazy patchwork and a lot of work for people trying to decide whether jury trials 
should be granted”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375149 
W03_CRANE.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/19  1:23 PM 
2019] INCORPORATING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 29 
collateral consequences are varied and messy.  The metric of 
imprisonment lends itself to bright lines and clear rules; collateral 
consequences lend themselves to more complicated lines and a 
preference for standards.  As a result, we now find ourselves in the 
otherwise curious place of simultaneously recognizing that the 
imposition of collateral consequences on defendants is a fundamental 
goal and tremendously important part of the criminal justice process 
but declining to recognize the relevance of collateral consequences 
when allocating procedural entitlements to defendants. 
The remainder of this Article seeks to ease these line-drawing 
concerns and proposes a path forward for incorporating collateral 
consequences into procedural entitlements, a path that has thus far 
eluded courts and commentators.136  Part III sets forth a general 
framework for incorporating collateral consequences—a framework 
that requires relatively minimal alterations to current doctrines and 
is eminently feasible.  Parts IV and V then take the framework of Part 
II and apply it to two separate constitutional rights—the right to 
counsel and the right to demand a jury trial—demonstrating how the 
framework I articulate in Part III can (and should) work in practice. 
III.  A FRAMEWORK FOR INCORPORATING COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES INTO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Subpart A lays out my proposed framework for incorporating 
collateral consequences into the allocation of procedural entitlements.  
Subpart B untangles collateral consequences and organizes them in 
a way that primes them to be incorporated into various procedural 
rights.  Subpart C then analyzes how to consider the relative severity 
of various collateral consequences in a way that is consistent with 
existing doctrines. 
A. The Path Forward 
Before detailing my proposed approach for incorporating 
collateral consequences, a preliminary remark is in order.  The 
specific framework I suggest is heavily influenced by concerns of 
practicality and feasibility.  In particular, my proposal seeks to work 
within existing doctrine as much as possible.  Legal change, and in 
particular judicially-managed legal change, tends to be incremental 
and hemmed in by precedent.  My framework recognizes that reality 
when explaining how best to incorporate collateral consequences into 
current determinations about procedural allocations. 
 
 136. As noted earlier, commentators have previously tended either to focus 
simply on immigration, see supra note 15, or argue that a procedural entitlement, 
like the right to counsel, should be allocated universally to all defendants given 
the increased prevalence of collateral consequences, see supra note 16.  This 
Article looks beyond immigration to other collateral consequences and identifies 
a more feasible path forward (doctrinally and budgetarily) than the calls for 
universal expansion of procedural entitlements. 
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In other words, for purposes of this Article, I do not argue that 
where the lines have been drawn for particular rights they should be 
altered.137  For example, I do not claim that the line dividing those 
defendants who receive a right to a jury trial from those defendants 
who presumptively do not—six months potential imprisonment—
should be changed in some way.  I do not, for example, argue that the 
dividing line should be moved to three months potential 
imprisonment, or that all defendants should receive a right to a jury 
trial.  Rather, I leave the lines of demarcation for each procedural 
entitlement where I find them and instead explain a path forward 
where collateral consequences are factored in given those existing 
dividing lines.138 
With that out of the way, below is my proposed path forward.  As 
an initial matter, each procedural entitlement needs to be viewed 
separately and treated individually.  Each procedural right has its 
own set of dividing lines and its own set of rationales for why those 
lines are drawn where they are.  Accordingly, the incorporation of 
collateral consequences must be on a right-by-right basis.  That said, 
the methodology for incorporating collateral consequences is the same 
across all procedural entitlements.  My approach consists of three 
steps: 
1. Step One: Identifying the Theory for How the Procedural 
Right at Issue Is Allocated Across Defendants 
First, courts should identify the dividing line for the particular 
right at issue and then ascertain the theory that underlies that 
dividing line.  In other words, courts must theorize why some 
defendants receive the right and others do not.  What is the line of 
demarcation representing and seeking to achieve?  How does the right 
at issue address relative severity and, therefore, how is it allocated 
across defendants?  The answer to these questions can and will vary 
 
 137. For one interesting example of scholars advocating for a new dividing 
line when it comes to the constitutional right to counsel, see Brandon Buskey & 
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon’s Promise: Using Equal Protection to 
Address the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299, 
2304 (2017) (urging courts to “abando[n]” the current “actual incarceration” 
standard for triggering the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and 
replacing it with a new line grounded in the right to meaningful access to courts 
under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 138. I also, for purposes of this Article, take it as a given that collateral 
consequences should be incorporated into determinations about how procedural 
entitlements are allocated.  As I have argued elsewhere, doing so would honor 
the basic principle that serious penalties warrant serious procedures.  See Crane, 
supra note 10, at 782.  Incorporating collateral consequences would yield 
numerous benefits to the criminal justice system and its participants.  See id. at 
834–38.  Moreover, and as discussed in Part I, collateral consequences are 
already enmeshed with many other aspects of the criminal justice system—
incorporating them when it comes to allocating procedural entitlements would be 
more, not less, consistent with that reality. 
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depending on the entitlement at issue.  Some rights, for example, will 
consider relative severity from the perspective of the defendant—is 
the defendant facing a consequence (e.g., imprisonment) of sufficient 
severity to trigger heightened procedural protections?139  Other rights 
will consider relative severity from a different perspective, such as 
that of the legislature, asking whether the offense with which the 
defendant is charged is sufficiently serious from a societal standpoint 
to trigger heightened procedural protections.140 
In addition, courts theorizing the dividing line for a given right 
must pay special attention to whether the dividing line is based on 
potential sanctions or guaranteed sanctions.  Potential sanctions are 
those that may, but ultimately may not, come to fruition.  Most, but 
not all, procedural rights are triggered by potential sanctions.141  
Guaranteed sanctions are, as one might imagine, sanctions that will 
in fact be imposed on the defendant upon conviction.  Fewer 
procedural rights, but still some, are triggered by sanctions that will 
definitely be imposed if the defendant is convicted.142 
When it comes to this potential-guaranteed axis, my framework 
adheres to the following analogy (the importance of which will become 
more apparent shortly): Collateral consequences that may, but may 
not, be imposed upon conviction—that is, collateral consequences 
where some modicum of discretion exists before imposition—are akin 
to potential imprisonment.  Collateral consequences that are 
mandatorily imposed upon conviction are akin to actual 
imprisonment. 
2. Step Two: Determining Which Collateral Consequences are 
Eligible to be Considered 
After ascertaining the theoretical underpinnings for how a 
particular procedural entitlement is allocated across defendants, the 
next step is to decide which collateral consequences should be 
considered when deciding whether a collateral consequence triggers 
that entitlement.  Not every collateral consequence will or should be 
eligible for such consideration.  That would be unwieldy and, more 
importantly, would ignore the theory underlying the allocation of the 
right at issue. 
Take the following example: If a procedural entitlement is only 
triggered by actual imprisonment (and therefore is not triggered by 
potential imprisonment), collateral consequences that are merely 
possible but not guaranteed should be excluded when deciding 
whether a defendant is entitled to that procedural protection.  To 
consider collateral consequences that may not ever come to fruition 
would be inconsistent with how the line treats imprisonment, since 
 
 139. See id. at 831, 833–34. 
 140. See id. at 830–31. 
 141. See discussion infra Subparts II.B.2., IV.A. 
 142. See discussion infra Subparts II.B.2., IV.A. 
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potential imprisonment alone does not trigger the procedural 
protection.  If, however, the entitlement can be triggered by potential 
imprisonment (regardless of whether any actual imprisonment is 
imposed), then collateral consequences that may not ultimately be 
imposed should also be considered. 
 Subpart III.B. goes into such eligibility considerations in more 
detail and identifies three characteristics of collateral consequences 
that will be relevant for determining which collateral consequences 
should be considered for incorporation under any particular right.  
For now, it is important to understand that the second step in my 
general framework is determining which collateral consequences are 
eligible for consideration.  A collateral consequence’s eligibility will 
depend on the theory underlying the allocation of the right at issue—
and not every collateral consequence will be eligible for each 
entitlement.  It is a consequence-by-consequence and right-by-right 
inquiry. 
3. Step Three: Deciding Whether an Eligible Collateral 
Consequence is Sufficiently Severe to Entitle the Defendant to the 
Procedural Protection at Issue (a.k.a., Conducting the “Relative 
Severity” Analysis) 
After concluding which collateral consequences are eligible for 
consideration for a particular entitlement, the third and final step is 
to determine whether any eligible collateral consequence is 
sufficiently severe to trigger the entitlement at issue.  If, for example, 
a procedural entitlement is triggered by six months of potential 
imprisonment, the court should determine whether an eligible 
collateral consequence should be considered at least as severe as six 
months potential imprisonment.  Or, if a procedural entitlement is 
triggered by one year of potential imprisonment, the court should 
determine whether an eligible collateral consequence is at least as 
severe as one year of potential imprisonment. 
Subpart III.C. explains how courts should go about determining 
the relative severity of collateral consequences, including how they 
should focus on the same sort of liberty interests that existing 
doctrines emphasize when it comes to imprisonment.  The point for 
now is that the final step is to take each eligible collateral 
consequence and determine whether it is sufficiently severe, based on 
where the demarcation line exists for the right at issue, to trigger the 
procedural entitlement. 
In sum, when incorporating collateral consequences into 
procedural entitlements, courts should: (1) ascertain the theory of 
relative severity that underlies the allocation of the right at issue; (2) 
determine which collateral consequences are eligible for 
consideration, based on the theory of relative severity it developed in 
step one; and (3) determine whether any eligible collateral 
consequence is sufficiently severe to trigger the entitlement at issue. 
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B. Which Collateral Consequences Are Eligible?: 
The Multiple Dimensions of Collateral Consequences 
As eluded to earlier, collateral consequences come in all shapes 
and sizes.  This can make the project of incorporating collateral 
consequences into criminal procedural entitlements a complicated 
enterprise.  Indeed, it is precisely these sorts of complications that 
discourage courts and legislatures from seeking to incorporate 
collateral consequences more broadly.  This Subpart eases some of 
that complexity by cataloging collateral consequences along several 
key dimensions: (1) whether the consequence is imposed 
automatically; (2) whether the consequence is imposed by the same 
sovereign prosecuting the offense; and (3) whether the consequence 
applies uniformly to all defendants convicted of the relevant offense. 
Examining these dimensions is important because they are 
relevant to a threshold issue that must be addressed when 
incorporating collateral consequences: which consequences should be 
considered when determining whether a defendant is entitled to a 
particular procedural entitlement.143  This is step two of my general 
framework.  The classifications detailed below are instructive for 
determining whether a particular consequence should be eligible for 
consideration depending on the procedural right at issue. 
1. Is the Collateral Consequence Imposed Automatically upon 
Conviction? 
The first dimension to consider is whether the collateral 
consequence is imposed automatically upon conviction, or rather if it 
is ultimately imposed at the discretion of an administrative entity 
(and therefore may not ever actually be imposed).  Some, but not all, 
collateral consequences are imposed automatically upon 
conviction.144  I will call consequences imposed automatically upon 
conviction “guaranteed sanctions” and consequences that may not 
ultimately be imposed “potential sanctions.”145 
 
 143. An alternative approach, and one I do not adopt here, is to simply say 
that all collateral consequences should be eligible for consideration.  That would 
be inconsistent with the theory and rationale for any right that is not allocated 
to all defendants.  If not, all defendants facing some term of imprisonment, for 
example, receive the procedural protection, why should all collateral 
consequences be considered?  The consequences considered should track the 
theory underlying how the right is distributed—and for any right that is allocated 
to some (but not all) defendants, some (but not all) collateral consequences should 
be eligible for consideration. 
 144. See, e.g., Robert M. A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, 16 CRIM. JUST. 
32, 33 (2001) (“These collateral consequences are simply a new form of mandated 
sentences.”); see also Crane, supra note 10, at 795 (explaining how many 
collateral consequences like sex offender registry and firearm prohibitions are 
mandatory and “cannot be circumvented by a sentencing judge”). 
 145. This distinction is similar to distinctions drawn by the ABA Criminal 
Justice Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualifications 
and the Uniform Collateral Consequences Act. 
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The distinction is important when it comes to incorporating 
collateral consequences into procedural entitlements because some 
rights are allocated based on “guaranteed sanctions”—like 
guaranteed imprisonment146—and some rights are allocated based on 
“potential sanctions”—like potential imprisonment.147  For rights 
allocated based on guaranteed sanctions, only those collateral 
consequences that are automatically imposed upon conviction should 
be considered at step three of my framework. 
For the four consequences described in Part II, two are 
guaranteed sanctions and two are potential sanctions: sex offender 
registration requirements and firearm prohibitions are guaranteed 
sanctions; immigration consequences and disqualification from public 
benefits are potential sanctions.148 
 
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards classifies collateral consequences as 
“collateral sanctions” or “discretionary disqualifications.”  It defines “collateral 
sanctions” as “a legal penalty, disability or disadvantage, however denominated, 
that is imposed on a person automatically upon that person’s conviction for a 
felony, misdemeanor or other offense, even if it is not included in the sentence.”  
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY 
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSON § 19-1.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N, 3d ed. 2004).  
And it defines “discretionary disqualification” as “a penalty, disability or 
disadvantage, however denominated, that a civil court, administrative agency, or 
official is authorized but not required to impose on a person convicted of an 
offense on grounds related to the conviction.”  Id. § 19-1.1(b). 
The Uniform Collateral Consequences Act defines a collateral consequence as a 
“collateral sanction or disqualification.”  UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONVICTION ACT § 2.1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2010).  It then defines “collateral sanction” as 
a penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however denominated, imposed 
on an individual as a result of the individual’s conviction of an offense 
which applies by operation of law whether or not the penalty, disability, 
or disadvantage is included in the judgment or sentence.  The term does 
not include imprisonment, probation, parole, supervised release, 
forfeiture, restitution, fine, assessment, or costs of prosecution. 
Id. § 2.2.  And defines “disqualification” as “a penalty, disability, or disadvantage, 
however denominated, that an administrative agency, governmental official, or 
court in a civil proceeding is authorized, but not required, to impose on an 
individual on grounds relating to the individual’s conviction of an offense.”  Id. § 
2.5. 
 146. Thiersaint v. Comm’r of Corr., 111 A.3d 829, 833 (Conn. 2015). 
 147. Id. 
 148. When it comes to consequences ultimately imposed at the discretion of a 
civil or administrative entity, there may be some debate over how to 
conceptualize the pertinent consequence.  Take immigration consequences as an 
example.  If the consequence is conceptualized as being deported from the United 
States, then that consequence is ultimately discretionary and may not actually 
materialize.  If, however, the consequence is conceptualized as “becoming 
deportable”—that is, a change in legal status—then that consequence is 
automatic and happens immediately upon conviction.  For purposes of this 
Article, I conceptualize the pertinent consequence as things beyond a change in 
legal status.  This is because all convictions lead to a change in legal status—one 
of convicted criminal. 
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2. Is the Collateral Consequence Imposed by the Same 
Sovereign Prosecuting the Offense? 
The next question to consider is whether the collateral 
consequence is imposed by the prosecuting jurisdiction or a separate 
sovereign.  Many collateral consequences are imposed by the same 
sovereign prosecuting the offense.  But some collateral consequences 
are imposed by a sovereign that is separate from the one prosecuting 
the case.  For example, a criminal conviction in state court can trigger 
consequences imposed by the federal government, such as 
immigration consequences,149 certain firearm prohibitions,150 and 
some disqualifications from public benefits.151  Similarly, a criminal 
conviction in federal court can trigger consequences imposed by a 
state government, such as sex offender registration requirements152 
or disqualification from other public benefits.153 
Whether a collateral consequence is imposed by the same or 
separate sovereign is relevant in the following way: if the procedural 
entitlement at issue is allocated based on how serious the prosecuting 
jurisdiction perceives the offense to be, then collateral consequences 
imposed by other jurisdictions should not be considered in the relative 
severity analysis.  This is because consequences imposed by other 
sovereigns fail to reflect the views of the prosecuting jurisdiction.  If, 
however, the procedural entitlement is allocated based on relative 
severity from the perspective of the defendant, then consequences 
imposed by other sovereigns are relevant to the analysis.  This is 
because, from where the defendant stands, it does not matter which 
government imposes the collateral consequence but rather whether 
the consequence will or may be imposed at all. 
Immigration consequences are imposed only by the federal 
government and thus will only be the same sovereign for federal 
prosecutions.  Sex offender registration is imposed by both state and 
federal governments and thus can be the same sovereign for both 
state and federal prosecutions.  The federal firearm prohibition will 
be the same sovereign for federal prosecutions and a different 
sovereign for state prosecutions.  Similarly, for states that have 
adopted firearm prohibitions for misdemeanor convictions, they will 
be the same sovereign for state prosecutions and different sovereign 
for federal prosecutions.  Finally, disqualifications for public benefits 
are imposed by state and federal governments, and thus whether a 
particular consequence is imposed by the same or separate sovereign 
 
 149. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
 150. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d)(1) (2012). 
 151. See Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral Consequences in the 
Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal Code, 
2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 253–54. 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 16912(a)–(b) (2012). 
 153. See Love, supra note 151, at 253–54. 
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will depend on whom is prosecuting the case and which consequence 
is being considered. 
3. Does the Consequence Uniformly Apply to All Defendants? 
The final question to consider is whether the collateral 
consequence is uniformly imposed on all defendants convicted of the 
given offense or if the consequence is imposed only on some 
defendants.  Most consequences apply the same to all defendants 
convicted of a qualifying offense.  For example, firearm prohibitions, 
sex offender registration requirements, and most disqualifications 
from public benefits are uniformly applied to all defendants.154  But 
some consequences do not work this way.  For example, immigration 
consequences do not apply evenly across defendants; rather, they 
apply only to noncitizen defendants.  For example, an American 
citizen and non-American citizen can both be convicted of the same 
misdemeanor drug offense, but only the noncitizen will face the 
collateral consequence of deportation.155 
Whether a collateral consequence is imposed uniformly across all 
defendants convicted of a particular offense is relevant for much the 
same reason that the identity of the jurisdiction imposing the 
consequence is relevant—it relates to which perspective the 
procedural right at issue adopts when considering relative severity.  
If the theory underlying the entitlement views relative severity from 
the perspective of the defendant, then it does not matter whether the 
collateral consequence applies to some defendants but not others.  All 
that matters is whether the consequence may be imposed on that 
particular defendant.  If, however, the theory underlying the 
entitlement views relative severity from the perspective of the 
legislature that adopted the offense charged, consequences that are 
not imposed uniformly should be excluded from consideration and 
therefore ineligible for the relative severity analysis performed in 
step three of my framework. 
Immigration consequences are not imposed uniformly, as only 
noncitizen defendants can be subject to such consequences.  
Requirements imposed on sex offenders are applied uniformly across 
defendants.156  Firearm prohibitions are likewise imposed uniformly 
across defendants charged with the same offense.157  Finally, 
 
 154. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text. 
 155. The fact that immigration consequences may be the basis for heightened 
procedural protections raises one of the most interesting and fascinating 
questions about integrating collateral consequences into criminal procedure.  For 
instances where immigration consequences entitle a defendant to additional 
procedures, one upshot is that noncitizen defendants will receive more procedural 
entitlements than American citizens charges with the identical offense. 
 156. See, e.g., Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 540–42 (Ariz. 2008) (concluding 
that sex offender registration requirements were uniformly applied to all 
similarly situated defendants). 
 157. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d)(1) (2012). 
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disqualifications from public benefits may or may not be applied 
uniformly, depending on the precise collateral consequence at 
issue.158 
Below are two charts that summarize the above discussion.  
Because the vast majority of criminal convictions in the United States 
are by state jurisdictions, the first chart is by far the more important 
one. 
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C. Ranking the Relative Severity of Collateral Consequences 
After determining which collateral consequences should be 
considered (step two), the next step is deciding whether an eligible 
collateral consequence is sufficiently severe to trigger the procedural 
entitlement at issue (step three).  This is another area where 
 
 158. See Love, supra note 151, at 253–54. 
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incorporating collateral consequences can be rife with complexity 
and, in particular, raises numerous issues related to 
incommensurability.159  Recall that under existing law the 
determination of whether a defendant receives a particular 
entitlement turns on a single type of sanction—imprisonment.160  By 
incorporating collateral consequences, however, things can no longer 
be so simple.  This Subpart addresses two important questions about 
how to determine whether an eligible collateral consequence is 
sufficiently severe to trigger the entitlement at issue.  In so doing, I 
also seek to substantially lessen concerns about incommensurability 
and slippery slopes. 
The first question is whether relative severity should be viewed 
from an objective or subjective perspective.  Viewing relative severity 
from a subjective perspective means judging (and comparing) the 
severity of a particular consequence on an individualized basis.161  
Each person will experience a particular consequence differently.  For 
some, losing the right to possess a firearm might be a tremendously 
significant consequence—weightier than jail time.  For others, losing 
that right might yield little more than a shoulder shrug.  For some 
defendants, especially the impoverished, being prohibited from public 
housing or certain welfare programs could be devastating.  For other 
defendants, like white collar criminals, such disqualifications might 
be utterly inconsequential.  A subjective assessment of severity would 
depend on each individual and how each collateral consequence would 
be experienced by that individual.  As a result, a subjective 
assessment would vary from person to person and consequence to 
consequence. 
This approach offers some benefits.  For example, assessing the 
relative severity of a particular consequence on an individual basis 
would further the goal of individualized treatment in the criminal 
justice system.162  Furthermore, such an approach might appear to 
ease some of the incommensurability concerns associated with 
collateral consequences because all one needs to do is inquire about 
how a particular consequence would impact a particular defendant.  
The need to determine whether sex offender registration or 
disqualification from public housing is, as a general matter, more 
severe would be unnecessary; all that would be necessary would be to 
determine which is more severe for that specific defendant.  Likewise, 
the difficult task of determining how many months imprisonment a 
particular collateral consequence would “equal” would be avoidable; 
 
 159. For a thoughtful and interesting essay on related issues involving 
relative crime severity, see generally Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and 
Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957 (2004). 
 160. See supra Part I. 
 161. See Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 71, 123–24 (2007). 
 162. Id. at 123. 
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all that needs to be determined is how many months imprisonment is 
the functional equivalent of a particular collateral consequence for a 
specific defendant. 
The costs of the subjective approach, however, far outweigh the 
benefits.  To begin, such an individualized, case-by-case approach 
would prove exceedingly difficult.  It would be hard, to say the least, 
to accurately and fairly assess how severe each and every collateral 
consequence would be for each and every defendant.  Indeterminacy 
of that magnitude, combined with the wide discretion afforded trial 
judges on such matters, would likely lead to disparate results across 
defendants.  And, like other disparate results, it would likely have a 
regressive impact on racial and ethnic minorities and on indigent 
defendants.  Such an approach would also incentivize defendants to 
claim that whatever collateral consequences applied were, in fact, 
quite severe to them—even if that were not true.  A defendant facing 
firearm prohibitions might actually care very little about her Second 
Amendment rights, but if claiming that such a prohibition would 
severely impact her were the difference between the right to counsel 
or the right to a jury trial, then odds are that defendant will have a 
newfound appreciation for her right to bear arms. 
Finally, a subjective approach would be inconsistent with current 
doctrines about relative severity, all of which follow an objective 
approach—that is, an approach that objectively assesses the relative 
severity of a particular sanction.163  For example, when determining 
whether a defendant is entitled to a right that turns on potential 
imprisonment—say the right to a jury trial, which is automatically 
given for offenses authorizing more than six months imprisonment—
courts do not inquire about the impact such imprisonment might have 
on an individual defendant, or how that individual defendant would 
be affected by such a possible stint in the clink.164  As with any 
possible sanction, not all defendants are going to experience 
imprisonment equally.  For example, some defendants might 
experience five months imprisonment the same way another would 
experience six months.  Does that mean the first defendant should 
also receive a jury trial?  Existing doctrines offer a resounding no.  
They instead all look at relative severity through an objective lens.  
The same should be done when it comes to incorporating collateral 
consequences. 
Having determined that the relative severity of a collateral 
consequence should be viewed objectively, the next question to 
 
 163. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (“In determining 
whether the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other 
punishment is enough in itself to require a jury trial, we . . . refer to objective 
criteria.”). 
 164. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541–44 (1979) (determining that prison 
conditions for pretrial defendants do not amount to a Due Process violation, 
“particularly where it appears that nearly all pre-trial detainees are released 
within 60 days”). 
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consider is what metric or method should be used to assess a 
consequence’s relative severity.  Once again, there are several options 
from which to choose, assuming the right at issue does not provide 
further guidance.  For example, severity could be assessed based on 
the degree to which it infringes on a constitutional right (e.g., firearm 
prohibitions scoring high, public benefit disqualifications scoring 
low).  Or it could be assessed based on the degree to which it directly 
impacts a defendant’s day-to-day life (e.g., public benefit 
disqualifications scoring high, firearm prohibitions scoring low). 
And, once again, I propose hewing closely to existing doctrines 
and, specifically, the deprivation of constitutional liberty interests of 
the sort akin to imprisonment.  More specifically, I believe courts, 
absent more specific guidance based on the right at issue, should 
assess a collateral consequence’s relative severity by considering 
whether the consequence deprives or otherwise infringes on a 
defendant’s constitutional liberty interests to approximately the same 
degree as the relevant term of imprisonment.165 
This, to be sure, is an opaque standard, and one that is subject to 
reasonable disagreement.  While it might be nice to imagine a neat 
and tidy way to translate all collateral consequences into months of 
imprisonment—for example, deportation is worth sixty months’ 
imprisonment, lifetime sex offender registration is worth thirty 
months, and so on—such an enterprise would be little more than 
pulling numbers out of thin air. 
Fortunately, such precise measurements are rarely if ever 
needed for purposes of allocating procedural entitlements.  Most 
entitlements are triggered by either any amount of imprisonment 
(one day or more), more than six months imprisonment, or more than 
one year imprisonment.166  Thus, courts need only roughly assess a 
collateral consequence’s relative severity, placing it in one of four 
categories: (1) the functional equivalent of no imprisonment; (2) the 
functional equivalent of less than six months imprisonment (but more 
than zero); (3) the functional equivalent of six months and one day 
imprisonment to one year imprisonment; and (4) the functional 
equivalent of more than one year imprisonment. 
Recognizing there is room for reasonable disagreement, my own 
suggestion would be to assess the four collateral consequences 
 
 165. Derendal v. Griffith, 104 P.3d 147, 154 (Ariz. 2005) (“To mandate a jury 
trial, collateral consequences must approximate in severity the loss of liberty that 
a prison term entails.”); see also United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993) 
(considering whether a five-thousand-dollar fine and five years of probation with 
certain conditions “approximate the severe loss of liberty caused by imprisonment 
for more than six months”); Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 
(1989) (acknowledging that penalties other than imprisonment, such as 
“probation or a fine may engender ‘a significant infringement of personal 
freedom,’ but they cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison 
term entails”). 
 166. See infra Parts III (counsel), IV (jury). 
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discussed in this Article as follows.  Immigration consequences, such 
as permanent banishment from the United States, is the functional 
equivalent of more than one-year imprisonment.  “Like incarceration, 
deportation separates a person from established ties to family, work, 
study, and community.  In this forced physical separation, it is similar 
in severity to the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.”167  Because 
removal from the United States is for at least ten years and often for 
life,168 deportation is the functional equivalent of more than one-year 
imprisonment.169 
Sex offender registration is either the functional equivalent of 
more than one year imprisonment or the functional equivalent of six 
months and one day imprisonment to one year imprisonment.170  
Lifetime sex offender registration seems to fit comfortably in the 
latter and, while some may disagree, I believe fifteen years of sex 
offender registration is also a sanction that should be considered the 
functional equivalent of more than one year imprisonment. 
With respect to firearm prohibitions, I believe these are the 
functional equivalent of one day to six months’ imprisonment—
especially lifetime firearm bans.  “[T]he right to keep and bear arms,” 
the Supreme Court has held, “is fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty.”171  Firearm prohibitions thereby infringe on 
constitutional liberty interests more than zero,172 but not nearly as 
much as sex offender registration requirements or deportation do.  I 
accordingly would consider such prohibitions as the functional 
equivalent of between one day and six months’ imprisonment. 
As for disqualification from public benefits, this presents to me 
the most difficult category to assess.  On the one hand, 
disqualifications from public benefits can, depending on the 
 
 167. Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1250 (D.C. 2018) (citations and 
alterations omitted). 
 168. Id. at 1251, n.14 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1229a). 
 169. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017) (recognizing that 
“preserving the right to remain in the United States may be more important to 
the client than any potential jail sentence”). 
 170. See, e.g., Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d. 536, 541–44 (Ariz. 2008) (explaining 
why lifetime sex offender registration is a severe penalty—“much more severe 
than a comparatively short probation period”); see also Wayne A. Logan, Liberty 
Interested in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender 
Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1168–70 
(1999); Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders: Liberty, Protectionism, 
Justice, and Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397, 1398–99 (2009); Rachel 
Marshall, I’m a Public Defender.  My Clients Would Rather Go to Jail than 
Register as Sex Offenders, VOX (July 5, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016 
/7/5/12059448/sex-offender-registry. 
 171. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767, 778 (2010) (“[I]t is clear 
that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right 
to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system 
of ordered liberty.”). 
 172. See, e.g., id. at 778; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 
(2008). 
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defendant, have a truly significant impact on a defendant’s way of 
life.173  On the other hand, disqualifying a defendant from public 
benefits does not infringe on any recognized constitutional liberty 
interest—they are more like privileges than constitutional rights.  
And such disqualifications typically do not look or act like banishment 
in the way deportation does or, to a lesser extent, sex offender 
registration requirements do.  Depending on the specific benefit at 
issue, I would therefore categorize disqualification from public 
benefits either as the functional equivalent of no imprisonment or the 
functional equivalent of six months or less imprisonment—with most 
such collateral consequences being the equivalent of no 
imprisonment. 
The following chart summarizes my suggested categorizations of 
collateral consequences: 
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   X 
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Again, I want to emphasize that assessing the functional 
equivalent of any given collateral consequence is an area where 
reasonable people can disagree.  Moreover, for purposes of my project, 
the real point is to encourage courts (and legislatures) to begin 
thinking about collateral consequences in terms of these four 
categories: (1) ~No imprisonment; (2) ~one day to six months 
imprisonment; (3) ~six months and one day imprisonment to one year 
imprisonment; and (4) ~More than one year imprisonment.  While 
courts may at the outset reach different conclusions, they ultimately 
will settle on some sort of consensus over time.  In other words, any 
likely disagreement about appropriate categorization should not be a 
deterrent to engaging in the enterprise itself. 
 
 173. See generally Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2 (explaining 
the myriad of issues facing persons convicted of criminal offenses reentering 
society). 
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IV.  INCORPORATING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES INTO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
This Part incorporates collateral consequences into the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  Subpart A examines the circumstances 
in which the Supreme Court has held that an indigent defendant is 
entitled to counsel.  Subpart B explains which collateral 
consequences, based on the lines identified in Subpart A, should be 
eligible for consideration under my framework.  And Subpart C 
explains the circumstances in which a defendant should be entitled to 
counsel based on the collateral consequences he or she faces. 
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence.”174  Through a series of twentieth-century decisions, the 
Supreme Court extended the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel to 
include the right of an indigent defendant to have counsel appointed 
and paid for by the government.175  In Gideon v. Wainwright,176 the 
Supreme Court applied that right to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.177  In so doing, the Court observed that “any 
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”178  The Court 
has further recognized that the vital aid provided by counsel is by no 
means limited to potential assistance at the trial itself: “[T]o deprive 
a person of counsel during the period prior to trial,” the Court has 
cautioned, “may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the 
trial itself.”179  This is because “the right to counsel safeguards the 
other rights deemed essential for the fair prosecution of a criminal 
proceeding.”180 
In addition, defense counsel also provides crucial—perhaps even 
outcome-altering—assistance through pretrial investigation of the 
 
 174. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 175. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) (“There is considerable 
doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of 
the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused 
in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his 
defense.”). 
 176. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 177. Id. at 341–42. 
 178. Id. at 344 (describing this as “an obvious truth” and proclaiming that 
“[t]he right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental 
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours”); see also 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) (“The assistance of counsel is often 
a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial.”). 
 179. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985). 
 180. Id.; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) (“Without counsel 
the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through 
counsel that the accused secures his other rights.” (citations omitted)). 
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government’s case,181 considered preparation of possible defenses,182 
and informed plea bargaining.183  As the Supreme Court has 
observed, the “adversarial testing process” that lies at the heart of the 
American criminal justice system “will not function properly unless 
defense counsel has done some investigation into the prosecution’s 
case and into various defense strategies.”184  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that a conviction secured without “the guiding 
hand of [defense] counsel” is not “sufficiently reliable to permit 
incarceration” since it was not “subjected to the crucible of meaningful 
adversarial testing.”185 
Finally, “because the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than 
the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a 
defendant,” counsel’s assistance (or the lack thereof) during plea 
negotiations can dramatically alter a defendant’s fate.186  A defense 
attorney can “help to reduce the power imbalance between the state 
and the defendant by playing the roles of counselor (ensuring that 
defendants understand the consequences of accepting a plea offer) 
and negotiator (trying to negotiate the best plea possible).”187  
Without the assistance of counsel, a defendant that pleads guilty is 
likely to do so on comparatively worse plea terms than if counsel were 
provided.188  And, perhaps most critically, an innocent defendant 
proceeding alone may be more likely to plead guilty than if he had 
counsel’s aid.189 
Given all this, it is no surprise that the Supreme Court has 
declared that “[t]he right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is indispensable to the fair 
 
 181. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680–81 (1984). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Crane, supra note 10, at 825. 
 184. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384.  See generally Jenny Roberts, Too Little, 
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial 
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1106 (2004) 
(“Adversarial testing requires thorough exploration of defenses as to both guilt 
and potential penalties and also investigation into the prosecution’s case.”). 
 185. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 665, 667 (2002) (citation omitted). 
 186. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“[D]efendants require 
effective counsel during plea negotiations.”). 
 187. Clapman, supra note 15, at 596. 
 188. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (observing that 
“[c]ounsel is needed” for purposes of plea bargaining and guilty pleas “so that the 
accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the 
prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the 
prosecution”). 
 189. Clapman, supra note 15, at 596–97 (“Defendants, even if innocent, plead 
guilty to a misdemeanor with less trepidation.  Many may plead guilty on the 
rational calculation that the apparently minimal penalty attached to a plea 
conviction is preferable to the alternative: pretrial detention; the time that a trial 
will consume; the resultant lost wages, lost job security, and lost family time; and 
the risk of a greater penalty after trial.”). 
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administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.”190  And 
given all this, it is surprising (at least to the uninitiated) that many 
indigent defendants do not have a constitutional right to counsel.191  
Although the importance of counsel has been universally recognized 
by courts and commentators,192 the right to counsel is not allocated 
universally to all defendants.  Rather, the Supreme Court has held 
that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel only under one 
of two circumstances. 
First, any defendant charged with a felony offense has a federal 
constitutional right to counsel.193  “[A]bsent waiver,” the Supreme 
Court has explained, the “right to appointed counsel in felony cases is 
absolute.”194 
Second, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor offense has a 
constitutional right to government-provided counsel if he is 
“sentenced to a term of imprisonment.”195  In other words, “no 
indigent criminal defendant [may] be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to 
assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.”196  This is sometimes 
referred to as the “actual imprisonment” standard.197 
The Supreme Court has therefore drawn two lines when it comes 
to allocating the constitutional right to counsel—one for defendants 
charged with a felony offense and one for defendants charged with a 
misdemeanor offense.  If charged with a felony offense, the defendant 
has an “absolute” right to counsel based simply on the potential 
sanctions associated with felony offenses.  If charged with a 
misdemeanor offense, however, the defendant has a right to counsel 
only if there is the actual (or guaranteed) sanction of imprisonment. 
The Court has justified its comparatively unusual line-drawing 
for misdemeanor defendants on three interrelated grounds.  First, 
having “departed from the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment” 
by extending its protections to include the appointment of counsel for 
indigent defendants, the Court has recognized that it must fashion on 
 
 190. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168–69 (1985). 
 191. Crane, supra note 10, at 826–27. 
 192. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979). 
 193. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (confirming 
that a defendant charged with a felony offense has the constitutional right to 
counsel regardless of whether any prison time is actually imposed on the 
defendant); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). 
 194. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 664 (2002). 
 195. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74. 
 196. Id. at 374; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[N]o person 
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or 
felony unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”).  In Alabama v. Shelton, 
the Supreme Court clarified that a suspended prison sentence also may not be 
imposed on a misdemeanor defendant unless he was represented by counsel.  535 
U.S. at 662. 
 197. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 (adopting “actual imprisonment as the line 
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel”). 
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its own some set of parameters for when the right to counsel applies, 
even though the “precise limits and their ramifications” is less than 
“clear.”198  In other words, once the Court decided to extend the right 
to counsel beyond its original understanding, it also had to determine 
how far “to extrapolate an already extended line.”199 
Second, when deciding how far to extend the right to counsel, the 
Court has consistently rejected expanding it to all criminal 
defendants because such an “extension would create confusion and 
impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite 
diverse States.”200 
Third, and finally, concerns about causing such confusion or 
budgetary woes in the states must yield when it comes to sanctions 
the Court deems “so severe” that they “should not be imposed as a 
result of a criminal trial unless an indigent defendant had been 
offered appointed counsel to assist in his defense”—”regardless of the 
cost to the States implicit in such a rule.”201  Under existing 
precedent, the Court has concluded only that incarceration, “even for 
a brief period,” is sufficiently severe to require the appointment of 
counsel.202  This is because, according to the Court, “actual 
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere 
threat of imprisonment”—and therefore actual imprisonment, but not 
fines or the possibility of imprisonment, warrant the appointment of 
counsel.203 
Although the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky expanded the constitutional obligations of defense counsel 
 
 198. Id. at 372. 
 199. Id.  The Court has also recognized that it “cannot fall back on the common 
law as it existed prior to the enactment of that Amendment, since it perversely 
gave less in the way of right to counsel to accused felons than to those accused of 
misdemeanors.”  Id. 
 200. Id. at 373.  For a representative sampling of the extensive academic 
literature calling for the right to counsel to be extended to all criminal 
defendants, see Clapman, supra note 15; King, supra note 16; Marcus, supra note 
16; Roberts, supra note 46. 
 201. Scott, 440 U.S. at 372–73; see also Shelton, 535 U.S. at 667 (describing 
the “key Sixth Amendment inquiry” as “whether the adjudication of guilt 
corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit 
incarceration”). 
 202. Scott, 440 U.S. at 372–73. 
 203. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (“We reasoned that 
the Court, in a number of decisions, had already expanded the language of the 
Sixth Amendment well beyond its obvious meaning, and that the line should be 
drawn between criminal proceedings that resulted in imprisonment, and those 
that did not.”); Scott, 440 U.S. at 367. 
To be clear, nearly half of the states go beyond the federal constitutional-floor 
and provide counsel to an indigent defendant if he is charged with a misdemeanor 
that merely authorizes incarceration.  See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 89, § 
11.2(a).  A significant number of states, however, still limit the right to counsel 
to those instances in which imprisonment is actually imposed.  See id.; see also 
Shelton, 535 U.S. at 669 n.8; Clapman, supra note 15, at 593 n.43 (providing a 
sample of state requirements). 
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when it comes to advising a client about potential immigration 
consequences,204 those advice-related rights apply only in cases where 
the defendant has an entitlement to counsel in the first place.205  
Immigration consequences, like other collateral consequences, are 
still deemed irrelevant when determining whether a defendant has a 
constitutional right to counsel.206  Under existing precedent, “states 
allow trial courts to avoid appointing counsel simply by certifying that 
they will not impose incarceration regardless of the seriousness of the 
misdemeanor offense or the possibility that it will carry other 
consequences,” such as deportation, sex offender registration, or other 
significant sanctions.207 
Notably, when considering whether a defendant has a 
constitutional right to counsel, the Supreme Court considers the 
severity of the sanction from the perspective of the defendant.208  This 
is true both for the felony-based potential sanction line209 and the 
misdemeanor-based guaranteed sanction line.210  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has described the “key Sixth Amendment inquiry” as 
“whether the adjudication of guilt . . . is sufficiently reliable to permit” 
the imposition of a particular penalty (e.g., incarceration) on the 
defendant.211  The focus is on the impact the penalty has on the 
defendant, and whether an adjudication without counsel is 
permissible given that penalty. 
B. Which Collateral Consequences Should Be Considered 
Because the Supreme Court has considered relative severity from 
the perspective of the defendant, the fact that a collateral 
consequence may be imposed by a separate sovereign is not a basis 
for exclusion in this context.  Similarly, a collateral consequence is 
 
 204. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
 205. See id. 
 206. Clapman, supra note 15, at 603. 
 207. See id. at 592–93; Crane, supra note 10, at 827 n.254 (“As a matter of 
federal constitutional law, courts have uniformly concluded that an offense’s 
potential collateral consequences have no bearing on whether an indigent 
defendant is entitled to counsel.”). 
As a matter of state law, a handful of jurisdictions have indicated that 
an offense’s collateral consequences may be relevant to defining the 
scope of the right.  But those jurisdictions are few in number and, 
generally speaking, appear to consider an offense’s collateral 
consequences as merely one factor among many when deciding whether 
the right to state-provided counsel applies in a given case. 
Id. (citing 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 89, § 11.2(a)). 
 208. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (citations omitted) 
(recognizing a right to counsel for any actual imprisonment because “the prospect 
of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused 
as a trivial or ‘petty’ matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions 
affecting his career and his reputation”). 
 209. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 210. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. 
 211. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 667 (2002). 
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eligible for consideration even if it is not imposed across all 
defendants convicted of a particular offense.  This is because the right 
to counsel inquiry is a defendant-specific one: what are the 
consequences faced by the defendant in this case?  It does not matter 
if the consequences are faced by only some defendants charged with 
that offense, and it does not matter if the consequence is imposed by 
a separate sovereign. 
Since the Supreme Court has drawn two separate lines for 
allocating the constitutional right to counsel—one for felony 
defendants and one for misdemeanor defendants—considering which 
collateral consequences are eligible for incorporation also requires 
two tracks.  And, depending on which track a defendant is claiming a 
right to counsel, some collateral consequences should be excluded 
from consideration. 
For defendants seeking the right to counsel based on the 
misdemeanor track, only those collateral consequences that are 
guaranteed sanctions should be considered.  In other words, 
consequences that may not ultimately be imposed should be excluded, 
because the misdemeanor track focuses on actual sanctions, not 
potential ones.  Accordingly, defendants invoking this track may not 
claim a right to counsel based on potential immigration consequences 
or potential disqualifications from public benefits, as those involve 
potential sanctions, not guaranteed sanctions. 
For defendants seeking the right to counsel based on the felony 
track, however, all consequences may be considered.  This is because 
the felony track is not limited to “actual imprisonment,” but rather 
triggers the right to counsel based merely on potential sanctions. 
In sum, all collateral consequences may be considered, except for 
potential sanctions invoked under the misdemeanor track.  There, 
only guaranteed sanctions—that is, those consequences applied 
automatically upon conviction—should be eligible. 
C. Incorporating Collateral Consequences 
As noted, existing Supreme Court doctrine allocates the right to 
counsel along two tracks.  For a defendant invoking the felony 
track,212 he should be afforded the right to counsel if he faces a 
potential collateral consequence that is the functional equivalent of 
more than one year imprisonment.  This mirrors the rule set forth in 
Gideon and subsequent cases that afford a defendant the right to 
counsel when charged with a felony, which is an offense that 
 
 212. To be clear, I call this the “felony track” even though only misdemeanor 
defendants would be the ones claiming a right to counsel on the basis of a 
collateral consequence—since a defendant charged with a felony would already 
have the constitutional right to counsel.  My use of “felony track” and 
“misdemeanor track” refers to the two distinct bases for the right to counsel under 
existing Supreme Court case law—a track based on potential sanctions (felony 
track) and a track based on guaranteed sanctions (misdemeanor track). 
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threatens more than one year imprisonment.  Under this track, 
therefore, defendants facing potential immigration consequences 
upon conviction and defendants facing sex offender registration upon 
conviction should be entitled to counsel.  As explained above, each of 
these consequences are, in my view, the functional equivalent of more 
than one year imprisonment. 
For a defendant invoking the misdemeanor track, he should be 
afforded the right to counsel if he faces a guaranteed sanction that is 
the functional equivalent of at least one day imprisonment.  This 
mirrors the rule established in Argersinger213 and Scott,214 where a 
defendant is entitled to counsel if he or she is sentenced to any term 
of actual imprisonment.215  Under this track, therefore, defendants 
facing firearm prohibitions that are imposed automatically upon 
conviction should be afforded counsel.216  This is consistent with a 
provision of the federal law prohibiting possession of a firearm for 
those convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.  Under 
18 U.S.C §921(a)(33), the federal firearm prohibition should not apply 
after a conviction for what would otherwise qualify as a 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” unless “the person was 
represented by counsel in the case, or knowingly and intelligently 
waived the right to counsel in the case.”217 
Finally, any disqualifications from public benefits that are 
imposed automatically upon conviction and rise to the level of the 
functional equivalent of at least one day in jail should also trigger the 
right to counsel—although I expect that few such consequences will 
ultimately surpass that threshold. 
V.  INCORPORATING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES INTO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
This Part incorporates collateral consequences into the Sixth 
Amendment right to demand a jury trial.  Subpart A explains current 
Supreme Court doctrine regarding the right to demand a jury trial, 
and theorizes the line dividing those defendants entitled to a jury trial 
and those that are not.  Subpart B then analyzes which collateral 
consequences are eligible for consideration based on the line 
identified in Subpart A.  And Subpart C explains which collateral 
consequences should trigger the right to a jury trial. 
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial 
The Framers believed a defendant’s right to demand a jury trial 
was so important that they included it in the U.S. Constitution 
 
 213. 407 U.S. 25. 
 214. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
 215. Id. at 374; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. 
 216. Defendants facing sex offender registration requirements imposed 
automatically upon conviction should also be entitled to counsel under this track. 
 217. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A)(i), (B)(i)(I) (2012). 
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twice.218  The constitutional right to a jury trial, since incorporated 
against the states,219 provides a criminal defendant with “an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor 
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”220  According 
to the Supreme Court, the right to a jury trial exists “in order to 
prevent oppression by the Government” and reflects a deep 
“reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the 
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.”221  By “insist[ing] upon 
community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence,” 
the constitutional right to request a jury trial protects “against 
arbitrary law enforcement” and is “essential for preventing 
miscarriages of justice.”222 
Jury trials, and the possibility of a jury trial, also impose 
significant costs on the government.  “Compared to bench trials, jury 
trials often require prosecutors to engage in more intensive 
preparation and frequently entail more pretrial litigation over 
procedural and evidentiary issues.”223  Jury trials also, on average, 
take substantially longer than bench trials.224  Taken together, this 
means defendants with the right to demand a jury trial can threaten 
to consume the government’s most depleted and precious resource: 
time.225  As one scholar put it, “by withholding the jury trial right 
governments gain a major strategic advantage, depriving defendants 
of the option to threaten exercise of the right, with its associated 
 
 218. Article III, Section 2 states: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 3.  And the Sixth 
Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 219. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was incorporated against the 
states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 220. Id. at 156.  Blackstone described trial by jury as “the grand bulwark” of 
English liberties.  See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999) (quoting 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 342–44); see also District of Columbia v. 
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 634 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (observing that 
there is a “grave danger to liberty when one accused must submit to the uncertain 
judgment of a single magistrate”). 
 221. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155–56. 
 222. Id. at 156, 158; see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970) 
(“[T]he primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the possibility of oppression by 
the Government; the jury interposes between the accused and his accuser the 
judgment of laymen who are less tutored perhaps than a judge or panel of judges, 
but who at the same time are less likely to function or appear as but another arm 
of the Government that has proceeded against him.”); Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (“[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the 
interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment 
of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared 
responsibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or 
innocence.”). 
 223. Crane, supra note 10, at 807. 
 224. See id. at 806. 
 225. See id. at 806–08. 
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adverse impact on dockets and justice system resources.”226  For all 
these reasons, affording a defendant “the right to a jury trial very 
likely serves its intended purpose of making judicial or prosecutorial 
unfairness less likely.”227 
Despite the Supreme Court’s grand pronouncements about the 
importance and value of the right to a jury trial, not all criminal 
defendants are afforded such a right.  “At the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution there were numerous offenses, commonly described 
as ‘petty,’ which were tried summarily without a jury.”228  This “petty 
offense” exception, in which defendants charged with a petty offense 
do not receive the right to a jury trial, has been justified on the 
grounds that “the possible consequences to defendants from 
convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to 
outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified 
judicial administration resulting from the availability of speedy and 
inexpensive adjudications.”229  Put another way, for some defendants, 
the potential consequences of conviction are insufficiently severe to 
warrant imposing the attendant burdens of jury trials on the 
government and courts.230 
Because the Constitution does not explicitly provide for how to 
balance those competing interests, “the definitional task” of 
establishing the “boundaries of the petty offense category” has 
“fall[en] on the courts,” and it is the courts that must “draw a line in 
the spectrum of crime, separating petty from serious infractions.”231  
The Supreme Court has drawn that line as follows: An offense that 
threatens more than six months imprisonment is always considered 
serious and automatically triggers a defendant’s constitutional right 
 
 226. Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local 
Criminal Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 143, 158 (2009). 
 227. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158. 
 228. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937); see also 
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (“So-called petty offenses were tried without juries both 
in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt from the 
otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial 
provisions.”). 
 229. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160. 
 230. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) (“Where the accused 
cannot possibly face more than six months’ imprisonment, we have held that 
these disadvantages, onerous though they may be, may be outweighed by the 
benefits that result from speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications.”). 
 231. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160–61. As the Court recognized in Duncan, that 
“process, although essential, cannot be wholly satisfactory, for it requires 
attaching different consequences to events which, when they lie near the line, 
actually differ very little.”  Id. at 161.  “Indeed, the prospect of imprisonment for 
however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or ‘petty’ 
matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and 
his reputation.”  Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73. 
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to trial by jury.232  An offense that carries a maximum term of 
imprisonment of six months or less is presumed to be petty.233  That 
presumption is rebutted, however, and the defendant is entitled to a 
jury trial “if he can demonstrate that any additional statutory 
penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period 
of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative 
determination that the offense in question is a ‘serious’ one.”234  Other 
penalties that the Supreme Court has explicitly considered include 
fines,235 probation,236 and—most importantly for purposes of 
considering collateral consequences—suspension of a driver’s 
license.237 
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, therefore, whether a 
defendant is entitled to demand a jury trial depends on the relative 
severity of the offense with which he or she is charged.  And the 
relative severity of that offense is determined by the penalties the 
legislature has attached to a conviction for that offense—primarily, 
but not exclusively, the potential term of imprisonment.238 
 
 232. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541–42 (1989); 
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68–69.  As a result, all felony defendants, but only some 
misdemeanor defendants, have a constitutional right to a jury trial.  A 
misdemeanor defendant charged only with a “petty” offense has no federal 
constitutional right to a jury trial. 
 233. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543.  The Court previously “focused on the 
nature of the offense and on whether it was triable by a jury at common law.”  Id. 
at 541 (citing District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930)); Callan v. 
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555–57 (1888)).  See generally Colleen P. Murphy, The 
Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133–
35 (tracing the Court’s various approaches to the petty offense exception over 
time).  According to the Court, it shifted its attention to an offense’s potential 
term of imprisonment because that is a “more ‘objective indication[] of the 
seriousness with which society regards the offense.”’  Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 
(quoting Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969)). 
 234. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543.  In Blanton, the Court predicted that it would 
be the “rare situation where a legislature packs an offense it deems ‘serious’ with 
onerous penalties that nonetheless do not puncture the 6-month incarceration 
line.”  Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 
(1993) (repeating the “rare case” observation made in Blanton).  Notably, the 
Court made these predictions when misdemeanor offenses triggered far fewer 
collateral consequences than they do today. 
 235. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837–
38 (1994); Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 4; Blanton, 489 U.S. at 544; Muniz v. Hoffman, 
422 U.S. 454, 476 (1975). 
 236. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 5. 
 237. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 544 n.9 (“[W]e cannot say that a 90-day license 
suspension is that significant as a Sixth Amendment matter, particularly when 
a restricted license may be obtained after only 45 days.”). 
 238. Id. at 542 (“In using the word ‘penalty,’ we do not refer solely to the 
maximum prison term authorized for a particular offense.  A legislature’s view of 
the seriousness of an offense also is reflected in the other penalties that it 
attaches to the offense.”). 
Whereas a number of states follow the federal constitutional baseline when 
determining the scope of a defendant’s right to a jury trial, many others exceed 
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Critically, the allocation of the constitutional right to a jury trial 
is based on potential severity as viewed from the perspective of the 
legislature—not from the perspective of the defendant.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has specifically recognized that “the prospect of 
imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the 
accused as a trivial or ‘petty’ matter and may well result in quite 
serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation.”239  But 
the defendant’s perspective, the Court has reiterated, is not the 
relevant inquiry.  Instead, when “deciding whether an offense is 
‘petty,’ [the Court has] sought objective criteria reflecting the 
seriousness with which society regards the offense.”240 
The Court’s focus on the legislature and its view on severity was 
on full display in Lewis v. United States.241  In Lewis, the Supreme 
Court considered whether a defendant charged with multiple petty 
offenses was entitled to a jury trial, given that he faced in the 
aggregate more than six months imprisonment.242  The defendant in 
Lewis was charged with two separate offenses, each of which carried 
a maximum of six months imprisonment, and therefore faced up to 
one year imprisonment in total.243  The Court held that “no jury trial 
right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty 
offenses,” even if “the aggregate prison term authorized for the 
offenses exceeds six months.”244 
The Court clarified that the critical inquiry is whether any single 
offense authorizes a term of imprisonment in excess of six months.245  
This is because the right to a jury trial is reserved for “defendants 
accused of serious crimes,” and “we determine whether an offense is 
serious by looking to the judgment of the legislature.”246  “The fact 
that the [defendant] was charged with two counts of a petty offense 
does not revise the legislative judgment as to the gravity of that 
particular offense, nor does it transform the petty offense into a 
 
the constitutional floor and provide more expansive jury trial rights.  See Murphy, 
supra note 233, at 171–73.  For example, several states require a trial by jury for 
all offenses that authorize any amount of potential imprisonment.  See id. at 171–
72.  And some jurisdictions provide all criminal defendants a right to a jury trial.  
See id. at 171. 
 239. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970). 
 240. Id. at 68 (emphasis added); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
160 (1968) (“The penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken as a 
gauge of its social and ethical judgments of the crime in question.”(citation 
omitted)); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (noting that 
the right to a jury trial is based on severity as understood and reflected by the 
“laws and practices of the community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical 
judgments”). 
 241. 518 U.S. 322 (1996). 
 242. Id. at 323. 
 243. Id. at 326. 
 244. Id. at 323. 
 245. Id. at 326–27. 
 246. Id. at 327. 
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serious one, to which the jury trial right would apply.”247  The Court 
acknowledged that “the aggregate potential penalty faced by [the 
defendant] is of serious importance to him.”248  “But to determine 
whether an offense is serious for Sixth Amendment purposes,” the 
Court emphasized, “we look [only] to the legislature’s judgment.”249  
In other words, “[w]here we have a judgment by the legislature that 
an offense is ‘petty,’ we do not look to the potential prison term faced 
by a particular defendant, who is charged with more than one such 
petty offense.”250 
Notably, the Supreme Court has also limited its “legislative 
judgment” inquiry to the legislature that enacted the offense at 
issue.251  When determining whether a defendant has a constitutional 
right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court has held that the petty offense 
inquiry is based on whether the legislature that adopted the offense 
viewed it as serious.  For example, in Blanton v. City of North Las 
Vegas,252 the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant charged 
with DUI under Nevada law had a constitutional right to a jury 
trial.253  Nevada law provided that the defendant, if convicted of the 
DUI offense, could serve up to six months in jail, face up to 
one-thousand-dollar fine, would have to attend an alcohol abuse 
education course, and would lose his driver’s license for ninety 
days.254  The Court concluded that the defendant had no 
constitutional right to a jury trial, because “we do not believe that the 
Nevada Legislature has clearly indicated that DUI is a ‘serious’ 
offense.”255  The Court later explained the inquiry required by 
 
 247. Id. The Court went on to note that 
[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial extends only 
to serious offenses, and [the defendant] was not charged with a serious 
offense.  That he was tried for two counts of a petty offense, and 
therefore faced an aggregate potential term of imprisonment of more 
than six months, does not change the fact that the Legislature deemed 
this offense petty.  [The defendant] is not entitled to a jury trial. 
Id. at 330. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 328.  Based on the Court’s ruling in Lewis, a prosecutor that 
carefully engages in misdemeanor charge stacking can bring multiple charges 
and still avoid triggering a defendant’s right to a jury trial.  For more on this 
practice. 
 251. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–44, 545 n.11 (1989). 
This is significant because, as discussed above, other sovereigns (such as the 
federal government) may impose additional penalties upon conviction. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 543–44. 
 254. Id. at 539–40. 
 255. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).  The Court specifically declined “petitioners’ 
invitation to survey statutory penalties for drunken driving in other States.  The 
question is not whether other States consider drunken driving a ‘serious’ offense, 
but whether Nevada does.”  Id. at 545 n.11. 
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Blanton in the following terms: “the question [is] whether a particular 
legislature deemed a particular offense ‘serious.’”256 
B. Which Collateral Consequences Should Be Considered 
As explained above, the right to a jury trial is allocated based on 
the relative severity of the offense charged, and an offense’s relative 
severity is viewed from the perspective of the legislature that adopted 
the offense.  When determining relative severity, courts look to 
potential penalties that might result from a conviction.  This means 
that “potential sanctions,” such as potential collateral consequences 
that may not ultimately materialize, may be considered.  I accordingly 
disagree with courts, such as the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals in Foote v. United States,257 that have refused to consider 
collateral consequences that “could be imposed only in hypothetical 
civil or administrative proceedings.”258  Potential sanctions, not just 
guaranteed sanctions, are also relevant when it comes to the 
constitutional right to a jury trial. 
While potential sanctions should be considered, collateral 
consequences that are imposed by a separate sovereign should be 
excluded when determining whether a defendant has the 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  This is because such consequences 
do not reflect the views of the legislature that adopted the offense.  
Likewise, collateral consequences that are not imposed uniformly 
across defendants should be excluded from consideration, as a 
sanction imposed only on some defendants does not indicate that the 
legislature which adopted the offense believed that specific offense 
was sufficiently severe. 
As a result, immigration consequences, some firearm 
prohibitions, and some disqualifications from public benefits should 
not be considered when deciding whether the right to a jury trial is 
triggered.  Sex offender requirements, some firearm prohibitions, and 
some public benefit disqualifications, on the other hand, should be 
eligible for consideration in step three of my incorporation framework.  
I will now walk through each set of consequences, explaining whether 
and why they are eligible for consideration. 
1. Immigration Consequences 
Regardless of whether the prosecution is by a state government 
or the federal government, immigration consequences should not be 
considered when determining whether the defendant has a 
 
 256. United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 4 (1993).  In Nachtigal, the 
Supreme Court concluded that a DUI charge under federal law was a petty 
offense because Congress viewed it as such, based on the penalties it authorized 
upon conviction.  See id. at 4 (referring to the “controlling legislative 
determination” made by Congress). 
 257. 670 A.2d 366 (D.C. 1996). 
 258. Id. at 372. 
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constitutional right to a jury trial.  With respect to state prosecutions, 
any possible immigration consequences of conviction will be imposed 
by a separate sovereign—the federal government.259  Thus, 
immigration consequences that flow from a state conviction are not 
the sort of penalty that reflects how the legislature that adopted the 
offense (that is, the state government) views the relative severity of 
that offense. 
There have been three recent cases about whether a defendant 
subject to potential deportation upon conviction has a constitutional 
right to a jury trial, but only one reached the right result.  The Nevada 
Supreme Court correctly declined to consider a defendant’s potential 
deportation after a domestic battery conviction on the grounds that 
such a consequence is “not relevant because [it does] not reflect a 
determination by the Nevada Legislature that first-offense domestic 
battery is a serious offense.”260  It is the federal government, not the 
Nevada legislature, that attached potential immigration 
consequences to a possible conviction for a Nevada offense.261  
Accordingly, those federal consequences should not be considered 
when determining the relative severity of the Nevada offense. 
Conversely, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en 
banc, held that “the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury 
trial if he is charged with a deportable offense, even if the maximum 
period of incarceration does not exceed six months.”262  In so doing, it 
failed to recognize that deportation “should not be taken into account 
because it is a penalty that results from a congressional enactment 
and is not part of the penalty designated by the legislature that 
created the offense, in this case, the Council of the District of 
Columbia.”263  The court instead mistakenly focused on the fact that 
Congress “is the only legislative body that can prescribe the penalty 
of removal for a criminal conviction.”264  The District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals further concluded, without much reasoned 
explanation, that there “is no reason grounded in the purpose of 
Blanton’s penalty-based analysis to exclude from Sixth Amendment 
consideration the serious penalty of removal that attaches to a 
criminal conviction, and to which the accused is exposed, because it 
has been imposed by Congress rather than the local legislature.”265  
There is, in fact, a reason: Blanton instructs that relative severity is 
viewed from the perspective of the legislature that adopted the 
offense, not from the perspective of the legislature that imposes the 
sanction.266 
 
 259. Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 319 P.3d 602, 605 (Nev. 2014). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1260 (D.C. 2018). 
 263. Id. at 1257. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 1258. 
 266. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541–42 (1989). 
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The New York Court of Appeals made a similar misstep when it, 
too, recently held that a defendant charged with an otherwise petty 
offense is nonetheless entitled to a jury trial when facing the risk of 
deportation.267  The New York Court of Appeals accurately observed 
that “deportation or removal is a penalty of the utmost severity.”268  
But it mistakenly concluded that “it is not fatal to defendant’s claim 
that the penalty of deportation or removal from the country is 
imposed as a matter of federal, rather than state, law.”269  According 
to the New York Court of Appeals, the “salient fact is that a legislative 
body authorized to attach a penalty to a state conviction has 
determined that the crime warrants the onerous penalty of 
deportation.  That New York State could neither designate nor 
effectuate this specific penalty does not make it any less onerous.”270  
While the fact that removal is authorized by federal law does not 
make deportation less onerous on the defendant, it does—under 
existing Supreme Court precedent—make the sanction immaterial 
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right.  Like the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the New York Court of Appeals 
concentrated on whether deportation is severe (it is) and incorrectly 
disregarded whether deportation was imposed by the legislature that 
adopted the offense (it was not). 
With respect to federal prosecutions where a conviction could 
lead to deportation or other immigration consequences, there is no 
separate sovereign problem.  There is, however, another issue that 
precludes immigration consequences from being considered.  Because 
immigration consequences potentially apply only to noncitizen 
defendants, they are not a penalty that is uniformly applied across all 
defendants.  As a result, they should not be considered for purposes 
of determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial, because 
they do not reflect how Congress views the relative severity of any 
deportable offense.  Under existing doctrine, “when determining the 
right to a jury trial, [courts] are concerned with the seriousness of the 
offense, rather than with the impact of a conviction on an individual 
defendant.”271  Accordingly, courts should “consider only those 
consequences that apply uniformly to all persons convicted of a 
particular offense.”272 
 
 267. People v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168, 178 (N.Y. 2018). 
 268. Id. at 175. 
 269. Id. at 179; see id. at 180 (“Inasmuch as federal deportation will almost 
invariably flow from certain New York state convictions, we see no persuasive 
reason to exclude it from the constitutional inquiry of whether the penalties of a 
crime are severe enough to warrant extending the protections of a jury trial.”). 
 270. Id. at 179. 
 271. Derendal v. Griffith, 104 P.3d 147, 154 (Ariz. 2005). 
 272. Id. 
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2. Sex Offender Requirements 
As for collateral consequences imposed on sex offenders, those 
should be eligible for consideration, so long as they are imposed by 
the same sovereign prosecuting the offense.  Every state and the 
federal government have sex offender requirements for qualifying 
offenses, and for prosecutions where the jurisdiction prosecuting the 
offense would also be the offense imposing sex offender registration, 
the defendant should be constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.273  
Sex offender registration requirements, moreover, are applied 
uniformly across defendants.274 
This is another area where courts have nonetheless reached 
conflicting results.  The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, has 
correctly held that sex offender registration is a relevant penalty for 
determining whether a defendant has the constitutional right to a 
jury trial.275  Meanwhile, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
has incorrectly held that sex offender registration and related 
requirements imposed by the same sovereign prosecuting the offense 
should not be considered when deciding whether the defendant has 
the right to a jury trial.276 
3. Firearm Prohibitions 
As for firearm prohibitions, they typically apply uniformly so 
they should not be excluded on that basis.  The main question here is 
whether the jurisdiction prosecuting the offense is the same as the 
one that would impose a firearm prohibition.  As noted, the federal 
government imposes a firearm prohibition for all domestic violence 
misdemeanor offenses.277  But state prosecutions for such offenses 
should not consider that potential federal firearms ban because the 
penalty is imposed by a separate sovereign—namely, the federal 
government.278  If, however, the federal government is prosecuting 
 
 273. At least two courts have held, correctly in my view, that potential sex 
offender requirements imposed by a separate sovereign upon conviction—for 
example, by the defendant’s resident jurisdiction after a conviction by a different 
jurisdiction—should not be the basis for triggering a right to a jury trial.  See Ivy 
v. United States, No. 5:08-CR-00021-TBR, 2010 WL 1257729, at *3–4 (W.D. Ky. 
Mar. 26, 2010); Rauch v. United States, No. 1:07-CV-0730 WMW, 2007 WL 
2900181 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007).  These decisions correctly observe that sex 
offender requirements imposed by a separate sovereign do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the jurisdiction that adopted the offense of potential conviction. 
 274. See, e.g., Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 540–41 (Ariz. 2008). 
 275. Id. at 543. 
 276. Olafisoye v. United States, 857 A.2d 1078, 1083 (D.C. 2004). 
 277. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 278. See, e.g., State v. Woolverton, 371 P.3d 941, 944 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) 
(“Woolverton notes that federal law prohibits domestic-violence offenders from 
purchasing firearms.  But the existence of a federal statute says nothing about 
how the Kansas Legislature views the offense [of misdemeanor domestic 
violence], and we look to the punishments it has established to determine the 
seriousness of the offense.”); Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 319 P.3d 
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the qualifying offense, then the federal firearms ban should be 
considered.279 
Similarly, if the state has its own firearms prohibition for 
qualifying misdemeanor offenses, as many states do, then a state 
prosecution that could potentially lead to a state-imposed firearm ban 
should be considered.  Interestingly, whether a potential firearms 
prohibition triggers the right to a jury trial has been the most 
extensively litigated collateral consequence.280  And, once again, this 
is an area where courts have reached conflicting conclusions.281 
4. Disqualifications from Public Benefits 
With respect to disqualifications from public benefits, whether 
such a consequence should be considered here depends on the 
particular consequence at issue.  If it is imposed by the same 
sovereign and it applies uniformly across defendants, then it should 
be considered.  If, however, it is imposed by a separate sovereign—
such as a federal disqualification imposed after a state conviction—or 
if it is not imposed uniformly across all defendants convicted of the 
pertinent offense, then it should not be eligible for consideration. 
C. Incorporating Collateral Consequences 
Having determined which collateral consequences are eligible for 
consideration—sex offender requirements, some firearm prohibitions, 
and some disqualifications from public benefits—the next step is to 
decide which potential sanctions, if any, are sufficiently severe to 
trigger a defendant’s right to a jury trial.  Recall that the line dividing 
serious offenses from presumptively petty offenses for purposes of the 
constitutional right to a jury trial is six months of potential 
imprisonment.  And further recall that potential collateral 
consequences should be “viewed in conjunction with the maximum 
authorized period of incarceration” in order to determine whether 
they collectively “reflect a legislative determination that the offense 
in question is a ‘serious’ one.”282  For the reasons discussed below, sex 
offender registration and most firearm prohibitions should trigger a 
defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial, while disqualifications 
from public benefits should typically not trigger a jury trial right. 
 
602, 605 (Nev. 2014) (holding that the federal firearm ban for persons convicted 
of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense is irrelevant because it was Congress 
that enacted the firearm prohibition, not the applicable state legislature). 
 279. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Jardee, No. 4:09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242, at *2–4 (D.N.D. Feb. 
12, 2010); United States v. Combs, No. 8:05CR271, 2005 WL 3262983, at *2–3 (D. 
Neb. Dec. 1, 2005); United States v. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1318 (N.D. 
Okla. 2001). 
 280. See Crane, supra note 10, at 810, 810 n.163. 
 281. See infra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 282. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375149 
W03_CRANE.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/19  1:23 PM 
60 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
Because sex offender requirements are the functional equivalent 
of more than one-year imprisonment, they should trigger a 
defendant’s constitutional right to demand a jury trial.  The Arizona 
Supreme Court correctly held as much when it recognized, contrary 
to the conclusion of other courts, that “the potential of sex offender 
registration reflects a legislative determination that [the defendant] 
has been charged with serious crimes.”283  In support of its finding 
that sex offender registration was sufficiently severe to warrant a jury 
trial, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the obligations and 
restraints imposed on convicted sex offenders, such as the wealth of 
information the offender must provide upon his release, the duty to 
“notify law enforcement within seventy-two hours of any move or 
change of name,” and the “widespread publicity [that] accompanies 
sex offender registration.”284 
As for firearm prohibitions imposed by the same sovereign, those 
potential sanctions should also typically trigger a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  Because firearm prohibitions are, 
in my view, the functional equivalent of somewhere between one day 
and six months imprisonment, the defendant should be 
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial any time a firearm prohibition 
is paired with a potential term of imprisonment.285  This runs 
contrary to the position of most courts that have considered the 
issue.286  Those decisions, however, were all issued before the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago,287 which 
held that a person’s right to bear arms was a “fundamental” right.  
Those decisions should be revisited in light of McDonald and, for the 
reasons set forth earlier, a defendant facing a lifetime firearm 
prohibition should have a constitutional right to a jury trial.288 
 
 283. Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 543 (Ariz. 2008).  But see, e.g., Olafisoye 
v. United States, 857 A.2d 1078, 1084 (D.C. 2004) (holding there is no 
constitutional right to a jury trial for potential sex offender registration). 
 284. Fushek, 183 P.3d at 542–43. 
 285. If, however, there is no threat of potential imprisonment upon conviction, 
then the possibility of a firearm prohibition alone should not trigger a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a jury trial. 
 286. See United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that potential firearm prohibition is not sufficiently severe to render 
charged offense “serious” and therefore trigger the constitutional right to a jury 
trial); United States v. Jardee, No. 4:09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242, at *4 (D.N.D. 
Feb. 12, 2010); United States v. Combs, No. 8:05CR271, 2005 WL 3262983, at *3 
(D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2005).  But see United States v. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 
1317 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (holding “that a lifetime prohibition on the possession of 
a firearm is a serious penalty which entitles a Defendant to a jury trial under the 
6th Amendment”). 
 287. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 288. Courts denying a defendant a jury trial have also relied on 18 U.S.C. 
§921(a)(33) when concluding that the federal firearm prohibition does not render 
an offense “serious” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  Section 921(a)(33) 
provides in pertinent part that a person shall not be deemed to have been 
convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” and therefore shall not 
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As for disqualifications from public benefits that are imposed by 
the same sovereign that is prosecuting the offense, those 
consequences of conviction—while eligible for consideration—
typically should not trigger the constitutional right to a jury trial.  In 
Blanton, for example, the Supreme Court held that a ninety-day 
suspension of a driver’s license did not render an otherwise petty 
offense “serious” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.289  While some 
disqualifications may be sufficiently severe to trigger a jury trial 
right, those should be considered truly exceptional, as it will be 
unusual for such disqualifications to infringe on a defendant’s 
constitutional liberty interests to a degree approximating several 
months of imprisonment.290 
In sum, offenses that might lead to sex offender registration or 
extended firearm prohibitions—if such consequences are imposed by 
the same sovereign prosecuting the offense—should trigger a 
defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For far too long, criminal procedural entitlements have been 
distributed according to an outdated model, where heightened 
procedural protections are allocated based only on the sanction of 
imprisonment.  That model has not persisted because it is legally 
required, nor has it persisted because it leads to just or, for that 
matter, sensible outcomes.  But it has persisted nonetheless.  If 
 
be deemed to have been convicted of an offense that prohibits possession of a 
firearm in the future, unless his case was tried by a jury or he knowingly waived 
his right to a jury “in the case of a prosecution for an offense . . . for which a 
person was entitled to a jury trial in the jurisdiction in which the case was tried.”  
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2012).  “The statute’s express language,” the Eleventh 
Circuit explained in Chavez, “conveys Congress’ recognition that some domestic 
violence offenses do not carry with them the entitlement to a jury trial even 
though a conviction results in the prohibition of firearm possession.”  Chavez, 204 
F.3d at 1314.  While that observation is correct as far it goes—some jurisdictions 
will not afford defendants a right to a jury trial for offenses that qualify as a 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”—it does not mean that federal 
defendants facing a federal lifetime firearms ban should be deprived a right to a 
jury trial.  Section 921(a)(33) simply recognizes that some jurisdictions, such as 
state jurisdictions, may not provide a jury trial right for such offenses.  And as 
explained in the previous Subpart, the federal firearms prohibition should not 
trigger a right to a jury trial in a state prosecution.  See supra Subpart V.B. 
 289. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–44 (1989). 
 290. One such “exceptional” case may be the penalty at issue in Richter v. 
Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1990).  In that case, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that a fifteen-year driver’s license revocation was sufficiently severe to 
render the offense “serious” for purposes of the constitutional right to a jury trial.  
Id. at 1204 (observing that “[r]evocation of a license to operate a motor vehicle 
very often can work a substantial hardship on its holder” and that a “15-year 
license revocation, considered together with the maximum six month prison term, 
is a severe enough penalty to indicate that the Nebraska legislature considers 
third-offense DWI a serious crime”). 
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nothing else, this Article seeks to spark a broader conversation about 
how to chart a different course—one that aligns the allocation of 
criminal procedural protections with the indisputable reality that 
collateral consequences play a central role in our criminal justice 
system. 
As demonstrated by Part IV (incorporating collateral 
consequences into the constitutional right to counsel) and Part V 
(same for the constitutional right to a jury trial), a path forward—one 
that is feasible and largely consistent with existing doctrine—is 
readily available.  And the framework developed here is not limited 
to those two constitutional rights.  It can be applied by courts and 
legislatures to all procedural entitlements that are currently 
distributed unevenly across defendants, such as the right to a grand 
jury, the right to a preliminary hearing, and rules regarding 
increased discovery. 
It is now well accepted that collateral consequences have a 
tremendous impact on criminal defendants and are integral to the 
criminal justice system.  It will eventually become accepted that the 
procedural protections afforded to defendants should take these 
realities into account as well.  As courts and legislatures increasingly 
undertake the important project of incorporating collateral 
consequences into criminal procedural entitlements, this Article 
establishes a pathway for doing so in a manner that is theoretically 
coherent, doctrinally consistent, and practically feasible. 
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